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CIVIL PROCEDURE--A PRIOR GUILTY PLEA IS SUFFICIENT TO RAISE
AND ESTABLISH THE AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSE OF COLLATERAL ESTOPPEL
EVEN THOUGH THAT DEFENSE Is NEITHER PLEADED NOR ARTICULATED
AND No RECORD OF THE PRIOR PROCEEDING IS OFFERED INTO
EVIDENCE
Prznz v. Greate Bay Casino Corp. (1983)
In May 1981, employees of Greate Bay Hotel and Casino, Inc. (Greate
Bay) approached patron David Prinz while he was playing blackjack and
threatened to have him arrested if he did not leave.' Two months earlier, a
casino staff official had advised Prinz that he had been identified as a card
counter and that he would no longer be permitted to play blackjack on the
premises. 2 As several members of the security force escorted Prinz to the
door on this second occasion, a scuffle broke out.3 Prinz was knocked to the
floor, handcuffed and removed to a small detention room where he remained
until the Atlantic City police arrived, some thirty to forty minutes later.
4
The police took Prinz to the station where a Greate Bay security officer filed
a complaint against him for defiant trespass. 5 After he spent approximately
twenty hours in custody, Prinz appeared before the Atlantic City Municipal
1. Prinz v. Greate Bay Casino Corp., 705 F.2d 692, 693 (3d Cir. 1983).
2. Id The casino employees had told Prinz that if he attempted to play black-
jack in the future, he would be ejected as a trespasser. Id. This warning occurred in
March 1981, when the casino was known as the Brighton. Appellant's Appendix at
23a-25a, Prinz v. Greate Bay Casino Corp., 705 F.2d 692 (3d Cir. 1983) [hereinafter
cited as AA] (citing Prinz v. Greate Bay Corp., No. 81-4707 (E.D. Pa. 1982) (unpub-
lished trial record)). When Greate Bay Casino Corporation (Greate Bay) took over
and began operating the casino under the name of the Sands, it retained most of the
Brighton casino personnel, including those members of the security force who had
previously warned Prinz not to play blackjack at their tables. AA at 23a-25a, 96a-
98a, 103a.
Greate Bay did not allege at any time that Prinz had been disruptive or disor-
derly on either occasion. 705 F.2d at 695 (Higginbotham, J., dissenting). For a dis-
cussion of a casino's right to eject an individual for being a card counter, see notes 53-
58 and accompanying text infra.
3. 705 F.2d at 693. There was conflicting testimony on whether the security
guards offered Prinz the opportunity to cash in his chips, worth approximately $250,
before he left. See AA at 34a-37a, 170a-171a. The scuffle occurred when Prinz
stopped at the casino exit and attempted to return to the main room. Id at 35a-40a.
Prinz alleged that the guards then began to punch and kick him, causing cuts over
his eyes and on his wrists, bruises to his hip and knees, and a groin injury. Id. at 41a-
42a, 48a-49a.
4. Id. at 46a. Prinz was placed on a small stool in the detention room and one of
his hands was cuffed to a metal bar that was attached to the wall. Id at 43a-44a,
136a.
5. 705 F.2d at 693. Defiant trespass is a statutory offense in New Jersey. The
relevant statute provides in pertinent part as follows:
h. Defiant trespasser. A person commits a petty disorderly offense if,
(857)
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Court.6 On the advice of a public defender assigned to that court, Prinz
pleaded guilty to the defiant trespass charge and paid a fine of twenty-five
dollars.
7
In November 1981, Prinz filed a diversity action in the United States
District Court for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania, charging Greate Bay
with assault and battery and false imprisonment.8 In its answer to Prinz's
complaint, Greate Bay denied that the casino had falsely imprisoned Prinz,
stating that its staff had merely held him on defiant trespass charges. 9 In the
course of the trial, Greate Bay elicited testimony from Prinz in which he
admitted pleading guilty to the trespass charge. 10 Greate Bay did not pro-
duce any record of the trespass complaint or conviction, nor did it use the
phrase "collateral estoppel" in any of its pleadings, arguments, or post-trial
motions.II The jury found Greate Bay liable on all charges and returned a
knowing that he is not licensed or privileged to do so, he enters or remains
in any place as to which notice against trespass is given by:
(1) Actual communication to the actor; or
(2) Posting in a manner prescribed by law or reasonably likely to
come to the attention of intruders; or
(3) Fencing or other enclosure manifestly designed to exclude
intruders.
N.J. STAT. ANN. 2C:18-3(b) (West 1982).
6. 705 F.2d at 693.
7. Id at 696 (Higginbotham, J., dissenting). Prinz testified on cross-examina-
tion that the public defender had told him that his "best bet" was to plead guilty and
pay the $25 fine that would be imposed. Id. (quoting AA at 62a). Prinz further
testified, "I didn't feel that I was guilty of anything, but . . .I was detained for 19, 20
hours and in a situation I had never been in and my main objective was to get my
freedom again." Id. (quoting AA at 62a). For the text of Prinz's testimony, see note
71 zhfra.
8. Prinz v. Greate Bay Casino Corp., No. 81-4707 (E.D. Pa. April 2, 1982) (un-
reported). Prinz, a citizen of Pennsylvania, sought damages in excess of $10,000;
hence federal jurisdiction was asserted on the basis of diversity of citizenship pursu-
ant to 28 U.S.C. § 1332 (1976). AA at 5a. The case was heard before a jury. AA at
14a. See FED. R. Civ. P. 38(b).
9. 705 F.2d at 693, 697. Greate Bay's answer designated six defenses to Prinz's
complaint, none of which referred to the trespass conviction. AA at 9a-10a. Among
its general denials Greate Bay stated, "The allegations of false imprisonment are de-
nied. To the contrary, defendant [sic] was detained pending the arrival of the Atlan-
tic City Police Department and plaintiff was charged and convicted of defiant
trespass." 705 F.2d at 693 (quoting from AA at 8a) [the denial mislabels plaintiff as
"defendant" in the second sentence]. The answer did not allude to "estoppel" at all.
705 F.2d at 697 n.4 (Higginbotham, J., dissenting).
10. 705 F.2d at 693. Greate Bay cross-examined Prinz on his plea to "the
charges" filed against him at the Atlantic City Police Department. Id (quoting AA
at 58a). No objection was raised by Prinz's counsel. Id. at 693. On redirect examina-
tion, Prinz's counsel asked him to explain the circumstances under which he pleaded
guilty. Id. at 695-96 (Higginbotham, J., dissenting). Prinz's explanatory testimony is
discussed in note 7 supra.
11. 705 F.2d at 695 (Higginbotham, J., dissenting). In motions for a directed
verdict at the close of Prinz's case and at the close of all evidence, counsel for Greate
Bay argued, "Then the false imprisonment claim, that he was detained while the
Atlantic City Police were called. He was arrested by the Atlantic City Police and
eventually pleaded guilty. I submit, your honor, that that would precluded [sic] his
[Vol. 29: p. 857
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judgment for Prinz in the amount of $105,000.12
Greate Bay argued on appeal that Prinz's trespass conviction collater-
ally estopped him from asserting that he was lawfully on casino premises,
and that consequently the casino had had probable cause to detain Prinz for
arrest. 13 The United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit vacated
and remanded, 14 holdng that an opposing party's testimony acknowledging a
prior guilty plea is sufficient to raise and establish the affirmative defense of
collateral estoppel even though that defense has been neither pleaded nor
articulated and no record of the prior proceeding has been offered into evi-
dence. Prinz v. Greate Bay Casino Corp., 705 F.2d 692 (3d Cir. 1983).
The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure were designed to liberalize tradi-
tional hypertechnical pleading requirements so as to facilitate proper deci-
sion making on the merits. 15 To assure that pleadings fairly apprise the
false imprisonment claim." 705 F.2d at 694 (quoting AA at 75a). This motion was
denied. Id. at 694. Greate Bay requested the following jury charge on the false im-
prisonment claim: "You must consider the fact that the Atlantic City Police Depart-
ment was notified immediately and took plaintiff into custody and charged him with
defiant trespassing. Plaintiff admitted that he pleaded guilty to this offense." Id.
(quoting AA at 266a). The district court refused this request and instead instructed
the jury that the arrest was without legal authority and therefore did not provide the
casino with a defense to false imprisonment charges. Id at 694 (quoting AA at 238-
39a). Further, the trial judge charged,
[D]efendant's employees did not have legal authority to arrest the plaintiff
for defiant trespass, because . . . the defendant did not have the right to
exclude the plaintiff from the casino as a suspected card counter. There-
fore, if you find from the evidence that . . . defendant's employees inten-
tionally detained [plaintiff] against his will, by actual force, for some
appreciable period of time, then you should find the defendant liable for
false imprisonment.
Id. Although the trial judge did not cite his authority for this statement of the law, he
may have relied upon a then-recent decision in which the New Jersey Superior Court
used similar language. See Uston v. Resorts Int'l Hotel, Inc., 179 N.J. Super. 223, 431
A.2d 173 (1981), aftd, 89 N.J. 163, 445 A.2d 370 (1982), noted in 28 VILL. L. REV.
451 (1983). For a discussion of Uston and the right of privately-owned businesses to
exclude individuals from their premises, see note 53-58 and accompanying text zhfra.
12. 705 F.2d at 693. Finding Greate Bay liable for assault and battery, and false
imprisonment, the jury awarded Prinz $5,000 in compensatory and $100,000 in puni-
tive damages. Id
13. Id. at 694. The district court's instructions to the jury are excerpted at note
11 supra. Greate Bay contended that these instructions were erroneous and that prob-
able cause to detain a defiant trespasser was a defense to a charge of false imprison-
ment. 705 F.2d at 694.
14. The case was heard by Judges Aldisert, Gibbons, and Higginbotham, with
Judge Gibbons writing the opinion of the court. Judge Higginbotham filed a dissent-
ing opinion. 705 F.2d at 692. Because the jury had not made separate damage
awards, the court vacated and remanded the entire case despite its holding that the
assault and battery verdict was not affected by the erroneous charge on false impris-
onment. Id at 695.
15. See Foman v. Davis, 371 U.S. 178, 181-82 (1962). The Foman Court stated
that "[tihe Federal Rules reject the approach that pleading is a game of skill in which
one misstep by counsel may be decisive to the outcome ....... Id See also Cook v.
Harris, 85 F.R.D. 279, 285 (N.D. Ga. 1979) (failure to use precise words in pleading
"is of little importance under a system of procedural rules where the guiding princi-
1983-84]
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court and opposing parties of disputed issues, rule 8(c) requires a party to
plead specifically any affirmative defense upon which it intends to rely at
trial. 16 However, so that defective pleadings do not result in forfeiture of
claims or defenses, the rules incorporate a liberal amendment policy.' 7 In
pie is that the rules 'shall be construed to secure the just, speedy and inexpensive
determination of every action.' " (quoting FED. R. Civ. P. 1)).
16. FED. R. Civ. P. 8(c). The rule reads in full:
(c) Affirmative Defense. In pleading to a preceding pleading, a party
shall set forth affirmatively accord and satisfaction, arbitration and award,
assumption of risk, contributory negligence, discharge in bankruptcy, du-
ress, estoppel, failure of consideration, fraud, illegality, injury by fellow ser-
vant, laches, license, payment, release, resjudicata, statute of frauds, statute
of limitations, waiver, and any other matter constituting an avoidance or
affirmative defense. When a party has mistakenly designated a defense as a
counterclaim or a counterclaim as a defense, the court on terms, if justice so
requires, shall treat the pleading as if there had been a proper designation.
Id (emphasis added).
An affirmative defense has been defined as "matter that is not within the claim-
ant's prima facie case." 2A J. MOORE & J. LUCAS, MOORE's FEDERAL PRACTICE
8.27[l], 8-243 (2d ed. 1983) [hereinafter cited as 2A MOORE'S FEDERAL PRACTICE].
In discussing the difference between an affirmative defense and a denial, the Oregon
Supreme Court explained that whereas a general denial "puts in issue every fact...
which the plaintiff is bound to prove," an affirmative defense tends to "contradict"
and not "destroy" the plaintiffs cause of action. Denham v. Cuddeback, 210 Or.
485, 490, 311 P.2d 1014, 1016 (1957) (citations omitted).
The general rule is that an affirmative defense not pleaded is waived. See FED.
R. Civ. P. 12(b). See also Sartin v. Commissioner of Pub. Safety, 535 F.2d 430, 433
(8th Cir. 1976). In Sarthn, Simpson Sartin, Jr. sued a police officer under 42 U.S.C.
§ 1983 for false arrest. Id. at 432-33. Sartin had been arrested on charges of operat-
ing a motor vehicle while under the influence of alcohol. Id. at 432. After his arrest
Sartin refused to submit to tests intended to determine whether he had been drink-
ing. Id. State law required any person arrested for driving under the influence to
submit to a test or face revocation of his driver's license. Id. Sartin was tried and
acquitted by a jury of the charges of operating a vehicle under the influence of alco-
hol. Id. However, he failed to appear at a trial on the license revocation issue and
soon after the default judgment was entered his license was revoked. Id. In Sartin's
subsequent § 1983 action, the officer pleaded neither collateral estoppel nor res judi-
cata as an affirmative defense, yet the trial court dismissed Sartin's false arrest claim
on these grounds. Id at 433. On appeal, the Eighth Circuit reversed, holding that
failure to plead collateral estoppel or res judicata amounts to a waiver of these de-
fenses, both at trial and on appeal. Id Other courts have also held affirmative de-
fenses were waived because they were not specifically pleaded. See United States v.
Masonry Contractors Ass'n, 497 F.2d 871 (6th Cir. 1974) (statute of limitations); Ha-
tridge v. Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co., 415 F.2d 809 (8th Cir. 1969) (estoppel); Systems Inc.
v. Bridge Elecs. Co., 335 F.2d 465 (3d Cir. 1964) (fraud); Wackerle v. Pacific Employ-
ers Ins. Co., 219 F.2d 1 (8th Cir. 1955) (estoppel). Rule 8(c)'s pleading requirement is
intended to facilitate judicial efficiency by notifying both court and counsel early on
in the adjudication that certain matters are sought to be avoided. Blonder-Tongue
Labs., Inc. v. University Found., 402 U.S. 313, 350 (1971). See also Mason v. Hunter,
534 F.2d 822, 825 (8th Cir. 1976) (because unpleaded issue of assumption of risk was
raised prior to trial and again in defendant's opening statement, plaintiffs had ample
notice and opportunity to argue the defense; therefore the defense was not waived);
Schultz v. Cally, 528 F.2d 470, 475 (3d Cir. 1975) (case remanded because defendant
was not put "on notice" of the unpleaded issue).
17. See FED. R. Civ. P. 15(b). The Supreme Court has stated that in the ab-
sence of any bad faith or dilatory tactics, leave to amend-as the rules require-
[Vol. 29: p. 857
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addition to permitting formal amendments to pleadings, rule 15(b) provides
that any issue not pleaded but tried by the express or implied consent of the
parties will be treated as if it had been properly pleaded.' 8
Generally, a litigant who asserts that unpleaded issues were tried by
implied consent must show a strong basis for this conclusion in the record. 19
should be "freely given." Foman v. Davis, 371 U.S. 178, 182 (1962). For a further
discussion of rule 15(b), see note 18 and accompanying text infra.
18. FED. R. Civ. P. 15(b). Rule 15(b) provides in full:
(b) Amendments to Conform to the Evidence. When issues not raised by the pleadings
are tried by express or implied consent of the parties, they shall be treated in all respects
as if they had been raised in the pleadngs. Such amendment to the pleadings as
may be necessary to cause them to conform to the evidence and to raise
these issues may be made upon motion of any party at any time, even after
judgment; but failure so to amend does not affect the result of the trial of
these issues. If evidence is objected to at the trial on the ground that it is
not within the issues made by the pleadings, the court may allow the plead-
ings to be amended and shall do so freely when the presentation of the
merits of the action will be subserved thereby and the objecting party fails
to satisfy the court that the admission of such evidence would prejudice him
in maintaining his action or defense upon the merits. The court may grant
a continuance to enable the objecting party to meet such evidence.
Id. (emphasis added).
In effect, rule 15(b) provides "two very different routes" for amendment. Nied-
land v. United States, 338 F.2d 254, 259 (3d Cir. 1964). The first is used when evi-
dence is introduced and objected to because it is not within the pleadings. Id. In
such case, the rule provides that the court may freely allow amendments to the plead-
ings. Id. In the second, no formal amendment is made; rather, the court finds that
an issue neither pleaded nor objected to has nevertheless been tried by express or
implied consent. Id For further discussion of the exception for issues tried by express
or implied consent, see notes 19-23 and accompanying text bnfra.
19. See, e.g., Schultz v. Cally, 528 F.2d 470, 475 (3d Cir. 1975). The Schultz court
stated that rule 15(b) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure is applicable
"only where it clearly appears from the record" that an unpleaded matter was in fact
tried and litigated by both parties." Id In Schultz, there had been no pretrial confer-
ence, and the court regarded the record of trial as incomplete. Id Hence, it would be
impossible to infer the necessary implied consent. Id. For the facts of Schultz, see note
21 infra. See also Radio Corp. of Am. v. Radio Station KYFM, Inc., 424 F.2d 14, 17
n.3 (10th Cir. 1970) (rule of implied consent is applicable "only where it clearly ap-
pears from the record" that the issue was in fact tried); Niedland v. United States,
338 F.2d 254, 258 (3d Cir. 1964) (court thoroughly examines prior record before
determining whether there was implied consent to litigate an unpleaded issue); Sys-
tems, Inc. v. Bridge Elecs. Co., 335 F.2d 465, 467 (3d Cir. 1964) ("we find nothing in
the record" to indicate that there was implied consent). For a discussion of the re-
quirement of a complete trial record as it relates to the doctrine of collateral estoppel,
see notes 31-35 and accompanying text infra.
Since judicial determinations of what was impliedly litigated are difficult, many
courts will at least question the failure of a party to request amendment of the plead-
ings. See, e.g., Albee Homes, Inc. v. Lutman, 406 F.2d 11, 13 (3d Cir. 1969) ("we are
not holding that if a party fails to raise an affirmative defense in his original respon-
sive pleading he is forever barred from raising it; we merely hold that normally the
proper remedy is to move for leave to amend" as opposed to a later contention of
implied consent. See also Mason v. Hunter, 534 F.2d 822, 825 (8th Cir. 1976) (it
"would have been better housekeeping for defendant to have requested an amend-
ment" than to rely on implied consent). In one case, the Sixth Circuit went so far as
to refuse to find that an affirmative defense had been tried by implied consent of the
1983-84]
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The Third Circuit has found that consent to litigate an unpleaded issue can
be properly inferred where (1) evidence linked to the unpleaded matter was
introduced; 20 (2) the opposing party had notice that the evidence went to
the unpleaded issue;2 1 and (3) the opposing party failed to object to the in-
parties because the defendants "should have moved the trial court for leave to
amend." United States v. Masonry Contractors Ass'n, 497 F.2d 871, 877 (6th Cir.
1974). According to the Masony court, the defendants' failure to make "any at-
tempt" to amend amounted to a waiver of that defense, even though the facts under-
lying that defense had been referred to in the course of the trial. Id
20. See Frietag v. The Strand, 205 F.2d 778 (3d Cir. 1953). Friilag involved a
suit by the government to recover a damage award Frietag had received in an unre-
lated lawsuit. Id at 779. The government alleged that Frietag had breached an
agreement to assign the award to the Internal Revenue Service by assigning to a
third party. Id Although the government did not plead fraudulent assignment, the
trial court found for the government on that ground. Id at 780. On appeal, the
Third Circuit was asked to determine whether there had been implied consent to
litigate this unpleaded issue. Id. at 781. Judge Hastie, writing the opinion, observed
that implied consent is usually found on the basis of one or more of the following:
both parties introduce evidence on an issue; evidence is introduced by one party and
no objection is raised by the other; or an "issue" not raised by the pleadings is "in
reality only an unanticipated line of proof" which serves to establish a duly pleaded
issue. Id However, the court stated, in this case the plaintiffs had failed to offer any
evidence of the unpleaded matter. Id There could not have been any implied con-
sent to litigate since there was no indication on the record that either party regarded
fraud as a subject at issue. Id. at 782. The court concluded, "It is not clear to us that
the parties ever addressed themselves to that issue .....Certainly, there was no
such clear framing of the issue and plain proof as is desirable on so grave a matter
.. Id See Niedland v. United States, 338 F.2d 254 (3d Cir. 1964) (since plaintiff
introduced substantial evidence on special damages, his failure to plead the affirma-
tive matter is not controlling); Systems, Inc. v. Bridge Elecs. Co., 335 F.2d 465, 467
(3d Cir. 1964) (since the only "evidence" of the affirmative defense of fraud was a
vague remark by plaintiff, defendant has not established that there was implied con-
sent to litigate that issue); see also Wirtz v. F.M. Sloan, Inc., 285 F. Supp. 669, 675
(W.D. Pa. 1968) (the failure of defendant to introduce evidence on the issue of ex-
emption amounts to a waiver of the affirmative defense).
21. See, e.g., Neidland v. United States, 338 F.2d 254, 258 (3d Cir. 1964). The
Third Circuit examined the relationship between sufficiency of notice and implied
consent to litigate at length in Schultz v. Cally, 528 F.2d 470 (3d Cir. 1975). In the
initial action Schultz had erroneously alleged diversity of citizenship on the basis of
the residencies (rather than the citizenship) of the parties. Id at 472-73. Neither the
district judge nor the parties made note of this error. Id. at 472. The case was tried
and judgment was rendered for the plaintiff. Id On appeal to the Third Circuit, the
defendants argued that the judgment was invalid because of lack of subject matter
jurisdiction. Id Schultz argued that the defendants, by failing to object to evidence
regarding interstate commerce, had impliedly consented that the adjudiction in-
volved a federal question, thereby establishing proper federal jurisdiction. Id at 473.
Schultz had not pleaded a federal question. Id On review, the Third Circuit empha-
sized that consent should only be found when it is clear that the party who has failed
to object to the introduction of evidence on an unpleaded issue knew or should have
known what was occurring. Id at 474. Quoting the Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals,
the court explained that under rule 15(b) of the FEDERAL RULES OF CIVIL
PROCEDURE,
[T]here is implied consent to litigate an issue if there is no objection to the
introduction of evidence on the unpleaded issue, as long as the non-ob-
jecting party was fairly apprised that the evidence went to the unpleaded
issue . . . . Amendment is not accomplished "merely because evidence
[Vol. 29: p. 857
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troduction of evidence on the unpleaded issue.2 2 Of course, in determining
whether the issues were expanded by implied consent, a reviewing court will
have to examine the entire trial record.
23
which is competent and material upon the issues created by the pleadings
incidentally tends to prove another fact not within the issues in the case."
Id. (quoting Simms v. Andrews, 118 F.2d 803, 807 (10th Cir. 1941)). After reviewing
the lower court testimony regarding interstate travel and mail, the Third Circuit
concluded that "seemingly innocuous" evidence on interstate transactions could not,
with certainty, have put defendants on notice that a federal securities act was as-
serted as a ground for federal jurisdiction. Id. at 475. Therefore, the court held, there
could not have been implied consent to litigate that issue. Id
The necessity of adequate notice as a prerequisite for finding implied consent to
litigate an unpleaded issue is well established. See, e.g., Albee Homes, Inc. v. Lutman,
406 F.2d 11, 13 (3d Cir. 1969) (plaintiff "did not put defendant on notice" that he
intended to litigate the issue of "release"); United States v. Masonry Contractors
Ass'n, 497 F.2d 871, 877 (6th Cir. 1974) (defendants were not given notice of statute
of limitations issue and therefore the issue was waived); Simms v. Andrews, 118 F.2d
803, 807 (10th Cir. 1941) (since there was no notice of the statute of limitations de-
fense, there was no implied consent to litigate and the defense is waived); Wirtz v.
F.M. Sloan, Inc., 285 F. Supp. 669, 675 (W.D. Pa. 1968) (no implied consent since
plaintiff "had no idea at any time prior to, during, or after the trial that the defense
of exemption . . . was even contemplated").
22. See Niedland v. United States, 338 F.2d 254, 258-59 (3d Cir. 1964). The
Neidland court stated that "a litigant cannot, for tactical purposes, stand by silently
while evidence is being admitted and then claim later that no relief can be given
because the matter was not plead [sic]." Id at 259. See also, Albee Homes, Inc. v.
Lutman, 406 F.2d 11, 13 (3d Cir. 1969) (if the adverse party makes no objection to
introduction of evidence on an unpleaded matter, "the issues are enlarged") (quoting
2A MOORE'S FEDERAL PRACTICE 8.27[3] at 1853 (2d ed. 1968)). See generally Barn-
well & Hays, Inc. v. Sloan, 564 F.2d 254, 255 (9th Cir. 1977) (plaintiff not only failed
to object to evidence of waiver, but argued the issue as well, thereby establishing
implied consent to litigate); Mason v. Hunter, 534 F.2d 822, 825 (8th Cir. 1976)
(court found implied consent to litigate defense of assumption of risk since evidence
on the matter was introduced without objection both before and during trial); Fed-
eral Say. & Loan Ins. Corp. v. Hogan, 476 F.2d 1182 (7th Cir. 1973) (a judgment
adverse to plaintiff in prior civil action to reform a mortgage estops plaintiff from
relitigating issue of fraud in formation of mortgage, even though collateral estoppel
not formally pleaded since plaintiff had treated the defense as if it had been pleaded);
Lasseigne v. Nigerian Gulf Oil Co., 397 F. Supp. 465 (D. Del. 1975) (plaintiff not
only failed to object, he argued as if the defense had been properly pleaded).
Conversely, the mere objection to evidence relating to unpleaded matters may
not, in itself, conclusively establish lack of consent. Consent is often inferred when a
deficient pleading is deemed to give ample notice of the unpleaded issue to the oppos-
ing party. See Barnwell & Hays, Inc. v. Sloan, 564 F.2d 254, 255-56 (8th Cir. 1977)
(allegations of a "verbal agreement" in defendant's pleading held sufficient to apprise
plaintiff of defendant's intention to rely on "waiver" as an affirmative defense); Mu-
tual Creamery Ins. Co. v. Iowa Nat'l Mut. Ins. Co., 427 F.2d 504, 507-10 (8th Cir.
1970) (references to a "legal novation" in the pleading impliedly raised the affirma-
tive defense of ratification). But compare Cook v. Harris, 85 F.R.D. 279, 285 (N.D. Ga.
1979) (reliance on court decision in the pleadings was sufficient for a defense of res
judicata) with United States v. Friedland, 391 F.2d 378 (2d Cir. 1968), cert. denied, 404
U.S. 867 (1971), and cert. denied, 404 U.S. 914 (1971) (a pleading of double jeopardy is
not adequate for a pleading of collateral estoppel even though both relate to the
effect of a prior proceeding). For a further discussion of the notice requirement, see
note 21 and accompanying text supra.
23. See, e.g., Schultz v. Cally, 528 F.2d 470, 475 (3d Cir. 1975). The Schultz court
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Because it is an affirmative defense, rule 8(c) requires that collateral
estoppel be specifically pleaded.24 Collateral estoppel is a common law doc-
stated that rule 15(b) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure is applicable "only
where it clearly appears from the record" that an unpleaded matter was in fact tried
and litigated by both parties. Id See also Radio Corp. of Am. v. Radio Station
KYFM, Inc., 424 F.2d 14, 17 n.3 (10th Cir. 1970) (rule of implied consent is applica-
ble "only where it clearly appears from the record" that the issue was in fact tried);
Niedland v. United States, 338 F.2d 254, 258 (3d Cir. 1964) (court thoroughly exam-
ines prior record before determining whether there was implied consent to litigate an
unpleaded issue); Systems, Inc. v. Bridge Elecs. Co., 335 F.2d 465, 467 (3d Cir. 1964)
("we find nothing in the record" to indicate that there was implied consent). For a
discussion of the requirement of a complete trial record as it relates to the doctrine of
collateral estoppel, see notes 52-55 and accompanying text infra.
24. For a discussion and text of rule 8(c), see note 16 and accompanying text
supra. Collateral estoppel, when raised by a defendant, is deemed an affirmative de-
fense in the federal system. Blonder-Tongue Labs., Inc. v. University Found., 402
U.S. 313, 350 (1971). However, the doctrine may be raised by either a plaintiff or a
defendant. See Cromwell v. County of Sac, 94 U.S. 351 (1877) (extensive discussion
on use by both parties).
Unlike the related doctrine of res judicata, collateral estoppel does not bar the
cause of action; rather, it only serves to remove from the court's consideration all
issues within that cause of action that have already been litigated. 1B J. MOORE, J.
LUCAS & T. CURRIER, MOORE'S FEDERAL PRACTICE $ 0.441[3], 722 (2d ed. 1983)
[hereinafter cited as IB MOORE'S FEDERAL PRACTICE]. A succinct approach for de-
termining the applicability of either of the two doctrines is found in United States
Mach. Corp v. United States, 248 U.S. 451 (1922):
[T]o determine the effect of a former judgment pleaded as an estoppel, two
questions must be answered: (1) Was the former judgment rendered on the
same cause of action? (2) If not, was some matter litigated in the former suit
determinative of the matter in controversy in the second suit?
Id. at 459. In the former instance, res judicata would be applicable, while in the
latter event collateral estoppel would apply. Id. Collateral estoppel has been vari-
ously labeled "issue preclusion," "preclusion by judgment," "estoppel by judgment,"
"estoppel by record," "estoppel by verdict," and, in older cases, simply "res judi-
cata." 1B MOORE'S FEDERAL PRACTICE, supra, 0.441[2], at 722-24. The Restate-
ment adopts the term "issue preclusion." RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF JUDGMENTS
§ 27 comments a & b (1982). The federal courts favor the term "collateral estoppel."
lB MOORE'S FEDERAL PRACTICE, supra, 0.441[2], at 724. For further discussion,
see Scott, Collateral Estoppel byJudgment, 56 HARV. L. REV. 1, 3 n.4 (1942).
The Restatement states the general rule of collateral estoppel: "When an issue
of fact or law is actually litigated and determined by a valid and final judgment, and
the determination is essential to the judgment, the determination is conclusive in a
subsequent action between the parties, whether on the same claim or a different
claim." RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF JUDGMENTS § 27 (1982). The United States
Supreme Court has offered this variation on the definition: "Under collateral estop-
pel, once an issue is actually and necessarily determined by a court of competent
jurisdiction, that determination is conclusive in subsequent suits based on a different
cause of action involving a party to the prior litigation." Montana v. United States,
440 U.S. 147, 153 (1979) (citations omitted). For a good overview of the doctrine of
collateral estoppel, see generally F. JAMES, CIVIL PROCEDURE §§ 11.18-11.22, 11.35
(1965); IB MOORE'S FEDERAL PRACTICE, supra note 24, 0.441-.448; RESTATE-
MENT (SECOND) OF JUDGMENTS §§ 27-29 (1982); Hazard, Res Nova in ResJudicata, 44
S. CAL. L. REV. 1036 (1971); Polasky, Collateral Estoppel-Effects of Prior Litigation, 39
IowA L. REV. 217 (1954); Scott, Developments in the Lat--ResJudicata, 65 HARV. L.
REV. 818 (1952) [hereinafter cited as Developments in the Law]; Scott, Collateral Estoppel
By Judgment, 56 HARV. L. REV. 1 (1942); Vestal, Aclusion/ResJudicata Variables." Na-
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trine that operates to preclude the relitigation of issues 25 which were actually
raised and litigated 26 and were essential to the judgment 27 in a prior judicial
ture of the Controversy, 1965 WASH. U.L.Q. 158; Comment, Collateral Estoppel byJudg-
ment, 52 COLUM. L. REv. 647 (1952); Note, Collateral Estoppel and the Dollar Lztgaton,
20 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 749 (1952). For a further discussion of collateral estoppel,
see notes 25-29 and accompanying text infra.
25. Montana v. United States, 440 U.S. 147 (1979). The Restatement has noted
that arriving at an exact definition of an "issue" may be "what is perhaps the most
difficult problem" in the area of collateral estoppel. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF
JUDGMENTS § 27 comment c & Reporter's Note, at 264 (1982). Professor Moore
comments that while the concept of a "cause of action" has received considerable
elaboration, the concept of an "issue" has not; as a result, courts "have been inclined
to decide cases upon implicit assumptions as to the identity of issue[s] . . . ." lB
MOORE'S FEDERAL PRACTICE, supra note 24, 0.443[2], at 760. The Supreme Court
has referred to an issue as simply a "relevant fact" to the case at bar. See Commis-
sioner v. Sunnen, 333 U.S. 591, 601 (1948). The Sixth Circuit has offered a more
precise definition of "issue" as being "a single, certain and material point arising out
of the allegations and contentions of the parties." Paine & Williams Co. v. Baldwin
Rubber Co., 113 F.2d 840, 843 (6th Cir. 1940). This is to be contrasted with a "cause
of action" which has been defined as a "right, question, or fact in controversy."
Oklahoma v. Texas, 256 U.S. 70, 87 (1921). See also Donegal Steel Foundry Co. v.
Accurate Prods. Co., 516 F.2d 583, 588 n.10 (3d Cir. 1975) (surveying numerous
definitions given for "cause of action").
26. Lawlor v. National Screen Serv., 349 U.S. 322, 326 (1955) (collateral estop-
pel precludes issues actually litigated regardless of whether the second proceeding is
on a different cause of action). In its literal sense, "litigate" means "to dispute or
contend" or "to contest in law." BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 841 (5th ed. 1979). The
Restatement strictly adheres to this definition, affording no preclusive effect to such
matters as admissions in the pleadings (either explicit or by virtue of failure to deny),
admissions in the course of the trial where no evidence on that issue has been ad-
duced, stipulations between the parties, and judgments entered by confession, con-
sent or default. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF JUDGMENTS § 27 comment 3 (1982).
For a discussion of whether a criminal conviction based on a guilty plea satisfies the
"actually litigated" requirement, see note 45 and accompanying text infra.
Aside from the question of whether actual litigation requires adversariness in its
literal sense, an issue is said to have been actually litigated only when it was "expressly
and definitely" presented in the prior suit. Montana v. United States, 440 U.S. 147,
157 (1979). It may have been presented in either the pleadings or in the course of
such trial or proceeding. Paine & Williams Co. v. Baldwin Rubber Co., 113 F.2d
840, 843 (6th Cir. 1940). Thus, issues that could have been raised but were not, have
no conclusory effect upon a subsequent litigation. See Cromwell v. County of Sac, 94
U.S. 351, 356 (1877) ("a point not in litigation in one action cannot be received as
conclusively settled ...upon a different cause, because it might have been deter-
mined"); Stebbins v. Keystone Ins. Co., 481 F.2d 501, 506 (D.C. Cir. 1973) ("[t]he
judgment is not conclusive, however, as to issues that might have been litigated and
determined in the earlier action, but were not"). Therefore, any defense which could
have been asserted but was not, may be asserted in a later proceeding on a new claim,
even though the two causes of action are closely related. Cromwell, 94 U.S. at 357.
The Cromwell Court stated that "nobody ever heard of a defendant being precluded
from setting up a defense in a second action because he did not avail himself of the
opportunity. . . in the first action." Id at 356. It should be noted that this tenet of
collateral estoppel represents one of the doctrine's primary differences from res judi-
cata. Under res judicata, or claim preclusion, all issues that either were raised or could
have been raised in a proceeding on the same cause of action are precluded from any
further litigation. See IB MOORE'S FEDERAL PRACTICE, supra note 24, 0.433[31, at
1983-84]
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proceeding.28 The potentially severe impact of collateral estoppel has tradi-
769-72. For a discussion on the distinction between collateral estoppel and res judi-
cata, see note 24 supra.
27. Montana v. United States, 444 U.S. 147, 153 (1979). An issue is "essential"
or necessary to the judgment of the earlier suit only if such judgment "could not have
been rendered without deciding that matter." Russell v. Place, 94 U.S. 606, 608-09
(1876). Immaterial or irrelevant issues, though vigorously litigated, will not generally
be given conclusive effect in a later proceeding in which the issue is material. 1B
MOORE'S FEDERAL PRACTICE, supra note 24, $ 0.444(5.- 1), at 781. See also Hicks v.
Quaker Oats Co., 662 F.2d 1158, 1168 (5th Cir. 1981) (it has always been the rule
that the prior judgment will not act as collateral estoppel if the issue was "incidental,
collateral, or immaterial" to prior judgment); Donegal Steel Foundry Co. v. Accurate
Prods. Co., 516 F.2d 583, 588 (3d Cir. 1975) ("[l]itigation of any matter that was
collaterally in question, incidentally cognizable, or to be inferred by argument from
the judgment is not restricted in a subsequent suit"); cf. Lynne Carol Fashions, Inc. v.
Cranston Print Work Co., 453 F.2d 1177, 1183 (3d Cir. 1972) (requirement that the
issue be necessary to the prior decision "is well entrenched in the law. The sound
basis for the principle is that parties should be estopped only on issues they actually
deem important, and not on incidental matters").
In order to determine whether the matter sought to be precluded was essential to
the earlier judgment, it is generally held that where the court of the earlier proceed-
ing fails to make express findings or where the record of the earlier proceeding has
not been offered into evidence in the subsequent action, invocation of collateral es-
toppel would be inappropriate. See, e.g., Sartin v. Commissioner of Pub. Safety, 535
F.2d 430, 433 (8th Cir. 1976) (no estoppel when it is "impossible to determine from
the record what issues of fact were actually litigated and determined"). For a further
discussion of this requirement, see note 32 and accompanying text infra. However,
Professor Moore states that in the absence of express findings, a court may occasion-
ally employ a "necessary inference" to discover what issues were actually adjudged.
lB MOORE'S FEDERAL PRACTICE, supra note 24, 0.443[4], at 775-76. The require-
ment that the inference be "inevitable," is generally a stringent one since the usual
rule is that the question of law or fact must be "distinctly put in issue and directly
determined" by the court in order to invoke collateral estoppel. Frank v. Mangum,
237 U.S. 309, 333-34 (1915). Thus, in one case, the Seventh Circuit reversed a lower
court's finding that because a jury had found a plaintiff guilty of resisting arrest, the
issue of excessive force incidental to that arrest was "necessarily determined in the
jury's finding." Williams v. Liberty, 461 F.2d 325, 327 (7th Cir. 1972). In reversing,
the circuit court held that those two issues were distinct and independent of one
another, and therefore determination of one could not be used to estop litigation of
the other. Id.
28. 1B MOORE'S FEDERAL PRACTICE, supra note 24, § 0.441[2], at 723-30. Both
collateral estoppel and resjudicata rest on the general judicial policy favoring repose
and the conclusiveness of matters already settled by judicial determination.
Oklahoma v. Texas, 256 U.S. 70, 85-86 (1921). As the Supreme Court has recently
stated, these doctrines serve to
relieve parties of the cost and vexation of multiple lawsuits, conserve judi-
cial resources, and, by preventing inconsistent decisions, . . . encourage re-
liance on adjudication . . . . When a state court has adjudicated a claim
or issue, these doctrines also serve to promote the comity between state and
federal courts that has been recognized as a bulwark of the federal system.
Kremer v. Chemical Constr. Corp., 456 U.S. 461, 466 n.6 (1982) (citations omitted).
See also United States v. Standefer, 610 F.2d 1076, 1092 (3d Cir. 1979) (application of
the principle "will (1) promote judicial economy by minimizing repetitive litigation;
(2) prevent inconsistent judgments that might undermine the integrity of the judicial
system; and (3) bar the harassment of a defendant through repetitious and vexatious
litigation"), aft'd, 447 U.S. 10 (1980); Bruszewski v. United States, 181 F.2d 419, 421
[Vol. 29: p. 857
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tionaly been tempered by the courts' willingness to consider the fairness of
invoking the doctrine under the particular circumstances of each case. 29
The party asserting collateral estoppel 30 has the burden of showing that
the issue presently before the court is identical to one which formed the basis
of the prior decision.3  This requires the litigant to produce an adequate
record of the earlier proceeding.3 2 This substantive burden stems from an
(3d Cir. 1950) (collateral estoppel promotes "[bloth orderliness and reasonable time
saving in judicial administration"), cert. denied, 340 U.S. 865 (1950).
29. See IB MOORE'S FEDERAL PRACTICE, supra note 24, 0.441[2], at 730. Al-
though collateral estoppel seems on its face a less drastic doctrine than resjudicata, it
can be "dangerously broader," in Professor Moore's words:
Because the effect of collateral estoppel, unlike that of resjudicala, is not
limited to the cause of action asserted in the initial suit, but extends to other
claims arising between the parties, unforeseeable and sometimes unjust re-
sults are possible, especially if the doctrine is applied without some degree
of flexibility. This danger exists when the issues concluded relate to facts on
which numerous subsequent actions might be based, and, because of the
smaller likelihood of foreseeability, it is even greater when the concluded
issues related to questions of fact or law that might be determinative in a
completely related controversy.
Id (footnote omitted).
Because of these dangers, then, courts have injected into the doctrine broad con-
cepts of fairness and flexibility. See Commissioner v. Sunnen, 333 U.S. 591, 599
(1948) ("collateral estoppel must be used with its limitations carefully in mind so as
to avoid injustice"). The expression generally used is that the litigant against whom
collateral estoppel is being asserted must have had a "full and fair opportunity to
litigate" that issue in an earlier case. Allen v. McCurry, 449 U.S. 90, 95 (1980). For
a further discussion of the requirement of a full and fair opportunity to litigate, see
note 38 and accompanying text infra.
30. For a discussion of the pleading requirements, see note 24 and accompany-
ing text supra.
31. Chisholm v. Defense Logistics Agency, 656 F.2d 42, 50 (3d Cir. 1981). The
Chisholm court stated that the burden of proof is on the party raising the issue of
collateral estoppel to establish that the doctrine should apply to an issue in the pres-
ent adjudication. id See also Scooper Dooper, Inc. v. Kraftco Corp., 494 F.2d 840,
844 (3d Cir. 1974) ("the issue decided in the prior litigation must be identical with
the issue presented in the action in question").
32. Oklahoma v. Texas, 256 U.S. 70, 88 (1921). The Oklahoma Court stated that
"[w]hat was involved and determined in the former suit is to be tested by an exami-
nation of the record proceedings therein, including the pleadings, the evidence sub-
mitted, the respective contentions of the parties, and the findings and opinion of the
court. ... See also Montana v. United States, 440 U.S. 147, 155-57 (1979) (in order
to determine whether the issues presented in the second litigation are the same as
those in the first, the court must review the entire record of the prior proceeding);
Ashe v. Swenson, 397 U.S. 436, 444 (1970) (use of collateral estoppel in a criminal
case "requires a court to examine the record of a prior proceeding, taking into ac-
count the pleadings, evidence, charge and other relevant matters"); United States v.
International Bld'g Co., 435 U.S. 502, 505 (1953) (collateral estoppel cannot be em-
ployed when "there is no showing in the record or by extrinsic evidence" of the issues
raised in the prior adjudication); Emich Motors Corp. v. General Motors Corp., 340
U.S. 558, 569 (1951) (what was decided by a criminal judgment must be determined
"upon an examination of the record, including the pleadings, the evidence submit-
ted, the instructions under which the jury arrived at its verdict, any opinions of the
court"). If the record appears vague as to the particular issues involved, operation of
collateral estoppel is considered inappropriate. See, e.g., Russell v. Place, 94 U.S. 606,
1983-84]
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early case in which the United States Supreme Court enunciated a pruden-
tial limitation on the doctrine of collateral estoppel.
33 In Russell v. Place,34
the Court ruled that before collateral estoppel may be employed, the record
of the earlier proceeding must clearly demonstrate that the precise matter at
issue was in fact litigated, and that its determination was necessary to the
prior judgment.3 5
Depending upon the court, the proponent may have additional bur-
dens. Under the traditional mutuality rule, a party seeking to assert collat-
608 (1876) ("it must appear by the record of the prior suit that the particular matter
sought to be concluded was necessarily tried or determined"). This principle is sup-
ported by decisions in the Third Circuit as well. See, e.g., Chisholm v. Defense Logis-
tics Agency, 656 F.2d 42, 50 (3d Cir. 1981) (the party seeking to effectuate an
estoppel must produce "a sufficient and adequate record" of the prior proceeding);
De Cavalcante v. Commissioner, 620 F.2d 23, 28 n. 10 (3d Cir. 1980) (in "situations
involving the collateral estoppel effects of criminal judgments based on conspiracy
counts, the trial court in the subsequent civil proceeding must examine the entire
record to determine exactly what was decided"); United States v. Standefer, 610 F.2d
1076, 1095 (3d Cir. 1979) (particularly in non-mutual collateral estoppel, the court
"would have to scrutinize the record of the prior proceeding with extreme care"),
af'd, 447 U.S. 10 (1980); Cities Serv. Co. v. Securities and Exchange Comm'n, 257
F.2d 926, 930 (3d Cir. 1958) ("we must not forget the reminder of the Supreme Court
that what was involved and determined in the former suit is to be tested by an exami-
nation of the record and proceedings therein").
33. Russell v. Place, 94 U.S. 606 (1876).
34. 94 U.S. 606 (1876). Russell involved the second of two actions by the plain-
tiff against the defendant for patent infringement. Id Although the patent covered
two processes for treating leather, the record of the first judgment, which was for the
plaintiff, did not indicate whether the court had determined the infringement was as
to both or just one of the processes. Id at 609. Therefore, the court refused to uphold
the patent holder's assertion of collateral estoppel against the defendant. Id.
35. Id at 608-09. The Court stated, "to render the judgment conclusive, it must
appear by the record of the prior suit that the particular matter sought to be con-
cluded was necessarily tried or determined,-that is, that the verdict in the suit could
not have been rendered without deciding that matter .... " .Id (citing Packet Co.
v. Sickles, 72 U.S. (5 Wall.) 580 (1866)). See also Hicks v. Quaker Oats Co., 662 F.2d
1158 (5th Cir. 1981) (refusing to give estoppel effect to either of two alternative
grounds after extensive examination of cases and authorities on the subject); Halpern
v. Schwartz, 426 F.2d 102 (2d Cir. 1970) (refusing to permit use of collateral estoppel
in relation to previous bankruptcy judgment which had expressly rested on three
independent grounds). Cf Scrofani v. Rare Bird Farm, Inc., 208 F.2d 461 (5th Cir.
1953) (prior decision not conclusive when it is uncertain upon which of the multiple
grounds the decision rested). See generally lB MOORE's FEDERAL PRACTICE, supra
note 24, $ 0.443[5.-2], at 789-93; Scott, supra note 24, at 845.
The Russell Court elaborated that "an estoppel must be certain to every intent;
and if upon the face of a record anything is left to conjecture as to what was necessar-
ily involved and decided, there is no estoppel in it when pleaded and nothing conclu-
sive in it when offered as evidence." 94 U.S. at 610 (citations omitted). See also
Lynne Carol Fashions, Inc. v. Cranston Print Works Co., 453 F.2d 1177, 1183 (3d
Cir. 1972) (since it is impossible to determine from the record of the prior proceeding
what facts were established, the plaintiff is not precluded from litigating the matter
in the second action). Russell has been consistently reaffirmed. See, e.g., Lawlor v.
National Screen Serv. Corp., 349 U.S. 322, 327 n. 12 (1955); Commissioner v. Sunnen,
333 U.S. 591, 598 (1948); Oklahoma v. Texas, 256 U.S. 70, 88 (1921); Basista v. Weir,
340 F.2d 74, 82 (3d Cir. 1965).
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eral estoppel must show that his adversary in the present case was a party, or
was in privity with a party in the earlier action. 36 The proponent may also
36. See Scooper Dooper, Inc. v. Kraftco Corp., 494 F.2d 840, 844 (3d Cir. 1974).
The traditional rule of collateral estoppel requiring mutuality of parties provided
that "unless both parties (or their privies) in a second action are bound by a judg-
ment in a previous case, neither party (nor his privy) in a second action may use the
prior judgment as determinative of an issue in a second action." Blonder-Tongue
Labs., Inc. v. University Found., 402 U.S. 313, 320-21 (1971). See also Russell v.
Place, 94 U.S. 606, 608 (1876) ("[it is undoubtedly settled law that a judgment of a
court . . . upon a question directly involved in one suit, is conclusive as to that ques-
tion in another suit between the same parties") (emphasis added); RESTATEMENT OF
JUDGMENTS § 93 (1942) ("a person who is not a party or privy to a party to an action
in which a valid judgment . . . is rendered . . . is not bound by or entitled to claim
the benefits of an adjudication upon any matter decided in the action"). The early
exceptions to this rule centered on the concept of privity, by which, for example, an
indemnitor would be estopped from relitigating issues in an action in which his in-
demnitee had been a party. See Moore & Currier, Mutuality and Conclusiveness ofJudg-
ments, 35 TUL. L. REV. 301, 311-29 (1961). See also lB MOORE'S FEDERAL PRACTICE,
supra note 24, 0.441[3.-1, -2], at 731-33; RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF JUDGMENTS
§§ 39-41, 51-58 (1982) (parties sharing some interest).
One of the first cases to reject this doctrine of mutuality of parties was Bernhard
v. Bank of Am. Nat'l Trust & Savings Ass'n, 19 Cal. 2d 807, 122 P.2d 892 (1942). In
Bernhard, a plaintiff who had previously and unsuccessfully sued the executor of an
estate for wrongfully withdrawing funds in decedent's bank account was estopped
from relitigating the issue of wrongful withdrawal in a subsequent suit against the
bank. Id The California Supreme Court, in permitting the defensive (defendant's)
use of collateral estoppel despite lack of mutuality, stated that there was "no compel-
ling reason . . . for requiring that a party asserting the plea . . . must have been a
party, or in privity with a party to the prior litigation." 19 Cal. 2d at 812, 122 P.2d
at 894. Thereafter, other courts, including the Third Circuit, followed California's
lead, at least with regard to successive civil suits. See Bruszewski v. United States, 181
F.2d 419, 421 (3d Cir. 1950) (mutuality notwithstanding, "the achievement of sub-
stantial justice rather than symmetry is the measure of the fairness of the rules of res
judtcata"), cert. denied, 340 U.S. 865 (1950). See also Cramer v. General Tel. & Elecs.
Corp., 582 F.2d 259, 267 (3d Cir. 1978) ("[m]utuality of estoppel is no longer re-
quired for the principle of collateral estoppel to apply," at least where the prior judg-
ment "is being invoked defensively against a plaintiff bringing suit on an issue he
litigated and lost as plaintiff in a prior suit"), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 1129 (1979); Hum-
phreys v. Tann, 487 F.2d 666, 669 (6th Cir. 1973) ("no satisfactory rationalization
has been advanced for the requirement of mutuality. Just why a party who was not
bound by a previous action should be precluded from asserting it as res jdtcata
against a party who was bound by it is difficult to comprehend"); United States v.
United Airlines, 216 F. Supp. 709 (E.D. Wash. 1962) (nonmutuality of parties is no
bar to use of collateral estoppel in tort case involving multiple claimants); De Polo v.
Greig, 338 Mich. 703, 62 N.W.2d 441 (1954) (a bankruptcy court's finding in a prior
proceeding that stock purchasers had waived their rights estops purchasers from relit-
igating that issue in a subsequent suit by them against the corporation's president);
Gammell v. Ernst & Ernst, 245 Minn. 249, 71 N.W.2d 364 (1955) (where issue of
fraud as to public accounting firm's conduct was previously litigated in a federal
action between stockholder and corporation for whom the firm performed their serv-
ices, that issue may not be relitigated even though accounting firm was not a party to
the prior action); Israel Wood v. Dolson Co., 1 N.Y.2d 116, 151 N.Y.S.2d 1, 134
N.E.2d 97, 99 (1956) (a defendant in a suit by plaintiff alleging wrongful inducement
of breach of contract, may assert collateral estoppel to preclude relitigation of the
issue of breach, since plaintiffis prior suit for breach of contract against another de-
fendant resulted in dismissal on ground that there had been no breach); Posternack v.
1983-84]
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be required to demonstrate that invocation of the doctrine would be fair and
appropriate on the facts of the case at bar.37 In this regard, many courts
American Cas. Co., 421 Pa. 21, 218 A.2d 350 (1966) (where a plaintiff institutes sepa-
rate suits for fire loss against two different insurers, the defendant insurer in the sec-
ond suit may plead collateral estoppel as to the issues necessarily decided in the
judgment of the first action against another insurer).
Despite the exceptions, as a general rule, mutuality of parties continued to be a
requirement for both res judicata and collateral estoppel in most jurisdictions well
into the 1960s. Moore & Currier, Mutuah'ty and Conclusiveness ofJudgments, 35 TUL. L.
REV. 301, 304 (1961) ("most state courts recognize and apply the doctrine of mutual-
ity, subject to certain exceptions . . . . And the same is true of federal courts when
free to apply their own doctrine").
However, in 1971, the Supreme Court, in Blonder-Tongue Labs., Inc. v. Universiy
Foundation, handed down the narrow but significant decision that mutuality of estop-
pel is not necessary where a patentee seeks to relitigate the validity of a patent and a
federal court has already declared that patent to be invalid. 402 U.S. 313, 349-50
(1971). The Blonder-Tongue authorization to nonparties went only to the defensive
assertion of collateral estoppel against a party to the prior action. Id. at 329-39. See
also Parklane Hosiery Co. v. Shore, 439 U.S. 322 (1979). In Parklane, the Court ex-
panded its assault upon mutuality, holding that under specifically defined circum-
stances, collateral estoppel may be asserted by a plaintiff who was not a party to the
prior litigation upon which the estoppel is based. Id. at 331-32. The Court stated
that a party may make offensive use of non-mutual collateral estoppel when he was
procedurally barred from joining in the prior action, and when use of collateral es-
toppel would not be unfair to the other party. Id. In discussing the impact of these
two decisions, Professor Moore has noted:
Looking at the decisions in Blonder- Tongue and Parklane together, and taking
the Restatement formulation as representative of widespread current think-
ing on the subject, it seems fair to state that while the prolonged ferment
over the mutuality rule has produced a broadening in the application of
estoppel, it has brought about a distinct shift toward viewing the doctrine of
collateral estoppel generally as less a set of fixed rules and more a presump-
tion to be followed unless the court thinks it would be fair to permit
relitigation.
lB MOORE'S FEDERAL PRACTICE, supra note 24, 0.441[3.-41, at 744. See also RE-
STATEMENT (SECOND) OF JUDGMENTS, § 29 and comments (1982). For general and
historical examinations of the mutuality doctrine, see Callen & Kadue, To Bury Mutu-
ality, Not to Pratse It. An Analysis of Collateral Estoppel After Parklane Hlosiety Co. v. Shore,
31 HASTINGS L.J. 755 (1980); Currie, Mutuah'ty of Collateral Estoppel Limits of the Bern-
hard Doctrine, 9 STAN. L. REV. 281 (1957); Moore & Currier, Mutuality and Conclusive-
ness ofJudgments, 35 TUL. L. REV. 301 (1961); Semmel, Collateral Estoppel, Mutuality and
Joiaer of Parties, 68 COLUM. L. REv. 1457 (1968); Vestal, Preclusion/ResJudlcata Van-
ables." Parties, 50 IowA L. REV. 27 (1964); Comment, Blonder-Tongue Bites Back.- Col-
lateral Estoppel In Patent Litigation-A New Look, 18 VILL. L. REV. 207 (1972); Note,
The Impacts of Defensive and Ofensive Assertion of Collateral Estoppel by a Nonparty, 35 GEO.
WASH. L. REV. 1010 (1967); Note, Collateral Estoppel of Nonparties, 87 HARV. L. REV.
1485 (1974); Note, A Probabh'stic Analyst of the Doctrine ofMutuah'ty of Collateral Estoppel,
76 MICH. L. REV. 612 (1978).
37. Kremer v. Chemical Constr. Corp., 456 U.S. 461, 480-81 (1982). The Court
in Kremer stated,
We have previously recognized that the judicially created doctrine of collat-
eral estoppel does not apply when the party against whom the earlier deci-
sion is asserted did not have a "full and fair opportunity" to litigate the
claim or issue . . . . Redetermination of issues is warranted if there is rea-
son to doubt the quality, extensiveness, or fairness of procedures followed in
the prior litigation.
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emphasize the need to ensure that the party against whom collateral estop-
pel is asserted had sufficient incentive to litigate the issue in the prior
adjudication. 38
Id (citations omitted). See also Scooper Dooper, Inc. v. Kraftco Corp., 494 F.2d 840,
844 (3d Cir. 1974) ("[p]rovided that the party against whom the plea is asserted has
had a full and fair opportunity to present his claim in the prior litigation, collateral
estoppel is available as a defense in this Circuit"); Township of Hopewell v. Volpe,
446 F.2d 167, 170 (3d Cir. 1971) (purpose of collateral estoppel is to limit litigation
only after a litigant has had "a full and fair day in court").
The Supreme Court has never squarely addressed precisely what constitutes a
"full and fair opportvnity to litigate." See Kremer v. Chemical Constr. Corp., 456
U.S. 461, 481 (1982) ("[o]ur previous decisions have not specified the source or de-
fined the content of the requirement"). However, the Court has suggested that
within limited circumstances, it may mean no more than a guarantee of due process.
Id
The Restatement has enumerated a number of circumstances which make col-
lateral estoppel inappropriate, all of which, presumably, rest on the lack of a "full
and fair opportunity" to litigate. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF JUDGMENTS § 28
(1982). Stated briefly, these are 1) the inability of a party to appeal the first adjudi-
cation; 2) the existence of changes in the law where an issue of law is involved; 3) dif-
ferences in the "quality and extensiveness" in the two proceedings; 4) a difference in
the burden of persuasion between the first and second action; and 5) the presence of a
"clear and convincing need" for a new determination because of the case's potential
impact on the general public, or because the second action was not sufficiently fore-
seeable at the time of the first action, or because of other "special circumstances"
whereby a party "did not have ,adequate opportunity or incentive to obtain a full
and fair adjudication" in the first proceeding. Id. For a critical discussion of the
Restatement's exceptions, see IB MOORE'S FEDERAL PRACTICE, jupra note 24,
0.441[3.-3], at 739-41. The following cases have recognized and examined some of
these exceptions under the proper circumstances: Montana v. United States, 440
U.S. 147, 162-63 (1979) (intervening changes in the law); Parklane Hosiery Co. v.
Shore, 439 U.S. 332, 330 (1979) (foreseeability of second suit; incentive to litigate the
first action); One Lot Emerald Cut Stones v. United States, 409 U.S. 232, 234-35
(1972) (differences in the burden of proof); Scooper Dooper, Inc. v. Kraftco Corp.,
494 F.2d 840, 846 (3d Cir. 1974) (intervening changes in the law); Stebbins v. Key-
stone Ins. Co., 481 F.2d 501, 511-12 (D.C. Cir. 1973) (other special circumstances-
plaintiff acting as own counsel in first suit) (Hannlon, J., concurring); The Evergreens
v. Nunan, 141 F.2d 927, 929 (2d Cir. 1944) (foreseeability of the second action).
Despite these factors, the Supreme Court has admonished that there is no "auto-
matic formula" for proper rulings on estoppel, since "[i]n the end," such decisions
will "rest on the trial courts' sense of justice and equity." Blonder-Tongue, 402 U.S. at
333-34.
38. Prosise v. Haring, 667 F.2d 1133, 1141 (4th Cir. 1982) ("among the most
critical guarantees of fairness in applying collateral estoppel is the guarantee that the
party sought to be estopped had . . . adequate incentive to litigate 'to the hilt' the
issues in question"), aft, 103 S. Ct. 2368 (1983). Judge Learned Hand has opined
that when the first adjudication involved a "trivial controversy," there was no reason
for "subjecting the loser to such extravagant hazards" as collateral estoppel can give
rise to in the subsequent actions. The Evergreens v. Nunan, 141 F.2d 927, 929 (2d
Cir. 1944). See also Hann v. Carson, 462 F. Supp. 954 (M.D. Fla. 1978) (where the
earlier case had "marginal consequences," incentive for "full-throttle litigation was
probably missing").
With the growing dissolution of rules on mutuality of parties and the trend to-
ward expanding the use of collateral estoppel, the factor of a party's incentive to
litigate is receiving greater attention. See, e.g., Parklane Hosiery Co. v. Shore, 439
U.S. 322, 330 (1979) (where there is no mutuality, use of collateral estoppel may be
1983-841
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Special considerations arise when collateral estoppel is asserted to pre-
clude relitigation of an issue that had been determined in a prior criminal
proceeding.3 9 For example, under the mutuality of parties rule, a civil liti-
unfair since the party to be estopped may have had "little incentive to defend vigor-
ously, particularly if future suits are not foreseeable"). Professors Vestal and Coughe-
nour have stated that a party's opportunity and incentive to litigate an issue should
be the "primary inquiry" by courts in subsequent actions where employment of col-
lateral estoppel is being considered. Vestal & Coughenour, Preclusion/Res judicata
Variables.- Crimntal Prosecution, 19 VAND. L. REV. 683, 718 (1966) [hereinafter cited as
Vestal & Coughenour, Crmtmal Prosecutions]. See also Vestal, The Restatement (Second) of
Judgments: A Modest Dissent, 66 CORNELL L. REV. 464, 465 (1981) (criticizing the
Second Restatement for not including the "incentive and opportunity to litigate" as
a principal ingredient of issue preclusion). The Third Circuit has noted that when a
party has had "every incentive to prosecute the action" use of collateral estoppel
would not be unfair. Cramer v. General Tel. & Elecs. Corp., 582 F.2d 259, 268 (3d
Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 1129 (1979). Numerous courts have addressed the
matter of incentive. See, e.g., Raiford v. Abney (In re Raiford), 695 F.2d 521, 524(11 th Cir. 1983) (although collateral estoppel is not per se unfair, "it may be unfair if
the party against whom it is used did not have the incentive to litigate the issue fully
in the first proceeding"); Southern Pac. Transp. Co. v. Smith Material Corp., 616
F.2d 111, 115 (5th Cir. 1980) (in previous action, defendant had "engaged in week-
long trial in which several hundred thousand dollars were at stake," and therefore he
had "every incentive to litigate"); Consolidated Express, Inc. v. New York Shipping
Ass'n, 602 F.2d 494, 504 (3d Cir. 1979) (no unfairness since party had "every reason
to expect that a defeat in the first action might lead to a second suit founded on thejudgment"), vacatedon other grounds, 448 U.S. 902 (1980); Miller Brewing Co. v. Joseph
Schlitz Brewing Co., 605 F.2d 990, 992 (7th Cir. 1979) (concept of "full and fair
opportunity to litigate" includes several factors "including incentive to litigate");
Stebbins v. Keystone Ins. Co., 481 F.2d 501, 513 (D.C. Cir. 1973) ("collateral estop-
pel is not an inexorable rule of law, and where a lay litigant may not be aware of the
need to oppose an assertion of fact," subsequent invocation of collateral estoppel
should be avoided); Safir v. Gibons, 432 F.2d 137, 143 (2d Cir. 1970) (collateral es-
toppel is appropriate since plaintiff's potential liability of $337,000 provided him am-
ple incentive to fully litigate in prior proceeding), cert. denied, 400 U.S. 942 (1970);
Berner v. British Commw. Pac. Airlines, 346 F.2d 532, 540-41 (2d Cir. 1965) (since
the first proceeding involved a trivial amount, defendant had no incentive to litigate
and thus should not be estopped from relitigating the issue in a subsequent suit);
Hyman v. Regenstein, 258 F.2d 502, 511 (5th Cir. 1958) (collateral estoppel is appli-
cable only if "it was foreseeable that the fact would be of importance in possible
future litigation"); Mooney v. Fibreboard Corp., 485 F. Supp. 242, 247 (E.D. Tex.
1980) (would not be unfair to employ collateral estoppel since the first proceeding
was "not a case where the defendants were sued for small or nominal damages").
For a discussion of the incentive to litigate factor as it relates to a prior guilty
plea's effect in a subsequent civil action, see notes 48-49 and accompanying text infra.
39. See United States v. Oppenheimer, 242 U.S. 84 (1916). Oppenheiner appears
to be the earliest of the United States Supreme Court cases to squarely base its hold-
ing on the principle that a criminal judgment may be given collatereal estoppel effect
in a subsequent criminal prosecution. 1d at 88. One year before Oppenheimer, the
Court had stated in dictum that the principle of collateral estoppel "is as applicable
to the decisions of criminal courts as to those of civil jurisdiction." Frank v. Man-
gum, 237 U.S. 309, 334 (1915). Since Oppenheimer and until recently, the Supreme
Court had treated collateral estopped as a coextensive but separate doctrine from
that of double jeopardy. In 1970, the Supreme Court held that the collateral estop-
pel effect of an acquittal was "embodied in the Fifth Amendment guarantee against
double jeopardy." Ashe v. Swenson, 397 U.S. 436, 445 (1970) (where defendant had
been successively acquitted and convicted for the same criminal transaction but in-
[Vol. 29: p. 857
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volved different victims). See also United States v. Keller, 624 F.2d 1154, 1155-57 (3d
Cir. 1980) (double jeopardy incorporation of collateral estoppel prohibits introduc-
tion of evidence which was used in a prior criminal prosecution that resulted in an
acquittal); United States v. Standefer, 610 F.2d 1076 (3d Cir. 1979) (double jeopardy
facet of collateral estoppel may not be invoked in the criminal trial of an aider and
abettor when the principal has been acquitted), affd, 447 U.S. 10 (1980); United
States v. Mespoulede, 597 F.2d 239 (2d Cir. 1979) (in a subsequent trial, the state is
precluded from making evidentiary use of prior conduct which was the subject of a
prior acquittal). But see United States v. Moore, 522 F.2d 1069, 1079 (9th Cir. 1975)
(evidence of prior acquittal allowed in subsequent prosecution without any discussion
of the constitutional scope of collateral estoppel), cert. denied, 433 U.S. 1049 (1976).
For a discussion of the application of collateral estoppel and the double jeopardy
clause of the Fifth Amendment to successive criminal actions, see Gershenson, Res
Judicata In Successive Criminal Prosecutions, 24 BROOKLYN L. REV. 12 (1957-58); Lugar,
Criminal Law, Double jeopardy and Resjudtata, 39 IowA L. REV. 318 (1953-54); Mayers
& Harbrough, Bs Vexar" New Trials and Successive Prosecutions, 74 HARV. L. REV. 1
(1960-61); McLaren, The Doctrine of ResJudicata as Applied to the Trial of Criminal Cases,
10 WASH. L. REV. 198 (1935); Schmidt, Res Adjudicata in Criminal Cases, 28 CAL. ST.
B.J. 366 (1951); Comment, Double jeopardy and Collateral Estoppel in Crimes Arising from
the Same Transaction, 24 Mo. L. REV. 513 (1959); Comment, Twice in Jeopard, 75 YALE
L.J. 262 (1965); Note, Double Jeopard and the Concept of Identity of Offenses, 7 BROOKLYN
L. REV. 79 (1937-38); Note, Expanding Double Jeopardy: Collateral Estoppel and the Evi-
dentiay Use of Prior Crimes of Which the Defendant Has Been Acquitted, 2 FLA. ST. U.L.
REV. 511 (1974). For a careful examination of current case law as it relates to collat-
eral estoppel, the fifth amendment's guarantee against double jeopardy, and the re-
quirement of mutuality of parties in successive criminal proceedings in order to
employ collateral estoppel, see United States v. Standefer, 610 F.2d 1076 (3d Cir.
1979) (an abettor may not invoke collateral estoppel based on the principal's acquit-
tal since mutual collateral estoppel is constitutionally required in criminal cases
before a jury), aft,', 447 U.S. 10 (1980).
Not all instances of successive criminal proceedings, of course, entail double
jeopardy considerations. Issue preclusion is frequently invoked in a second criminal
proceeding which clearly involves a different transaction or occurrence from the first.
See, e.g., United States v. Colacurcio, 514 F.2d 1, 6 (9th Cir. 1975) (facts essential to
defendant's conviction for conspiracy may not be relitigated at later trial for income
tax evasion); Hernandez-Uribe v. United States, 515 F.2d 20 (8th Cir. 1975) (where
defendant had previously been found guilty of illegal entry into the country, he was
precluded from relitigating the fact of his alienage); Pena-Cabanillas v. United
States, 394 F.2d 785 (9th Cir. 1968) (in trial for violation of immigration laws, de-
fendant is collaterally estopped from relitigating fact of alienage necessarily deter-
mined in prior conviction).
Where the action succeeding the criminal proceeding is a civil one, collateral
estoppel is subject to limitations inherent in the different burdens of proof in the two
adjudications. See 1B MOORE'S FEDERAL PRACTICE, supra note 24, 0.418[1], at 551.
In a criminal-civil sequence of proceedings, collateral estoppel is usually applied only
when the criminal trial resulted in a conviction. Id In an acquittal, the failure of the
government to establish the defendant's guilt beyond a reasonable doubt is not ac-
corded estoppel effect since civil proceedings require a lesser burden of proof than
criminal actions. See United States v. Burns, 103 F. Supp. 690 (D. Md. 1952) (widow
acquitted of murdering her husband is subsequently held to have murdered her hus-
band in a civil interpleader action to determine parties entitled to insurance pro-
ceeds), affd, 200 F.2d 106 (4th Cir. 1952). Occasional exceptions to this rule appear
in cases where the defendant in the prior criminal prosecution was acquitted on the
basis of his affirmative defense of alibi or insanity, since in such cases the defendant's
burden of proof is equal to or greater than the government's. Vestal & Coughenour,
Crimnal Prosecutions, supra note 38, at 702. For the same reasons, a civil judgment may
not normally be used to collaterally estop matters in a criminal prosecution since,
1983-841
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gant is rarely able to invoke the effect of a prior criminal judgment.40 Thus,
where strict mutuality is required, evidence of a prior conviction may be
admissible but is not conclusive in subsequent proceedings. 4 1 Some jurisdic-
tions recognize an exception to the mutuality rule, which allows a third
party to assert the collateral estoppel effect of a prior conviction where the
criminal subsequently seeks to benefit from his wrong in a civil action. 42 In
again, the latter action requires a higher standard of proof. Helvering v. Mitchell,
303 U.S. 391, 397 (1938). If, on the other hand, successive criminal proceedings are
involved, rather than criminal-civil actions, an acquittal may trigger the doctrine of
collateral estoppel. Ashe v. Swenson, 397 U.S. 436 (1970).
40. Vestal & Coughenour, Criminal Prosecutzins, supra note 38, at 705-08. As a
result of the mutuality rule, the majority of these cases pit the government against the
same party in serial criminal civil proceedings. See, e.g., Local 167 v. United States,
291 U.S. 293 (1934) (in civil injunction case instituted by government, defendants are
precluded from denying issues determined in prior conspiracy conviction); Moore v.
United States, 16 Am. Fed. Tx. R.2d 6058 (4th Cir. 1965) (serial criminal-civil in-
come tax actions); Tomlinson v. Lefkowitz, 334 F.2d 262 (5th Cir. 1964) (successive
criminal-civil tax proceedings), cert. denied, 379 U.S. 962 (1965); United States v.
Gramling, 180 F.2d 498 (5th Cir. 1950) (civil forfeiture action by government pre-
ceded by criminal conviction for illegal sale of marijuana). But see Helvering v.
Mitchell, 303 U.S. 391 (1938) (defendant's criminal acquittal for fraudulent tax eva-
sion will not preclude litigation of fraud issue in later civil suit by government to
recover unpaid taxes and penalty).
The Restatement contains a single section dealing with criminal-civil successive
actions:
§ 85 Efect of CriminalJudgment in Subsequent Civil Action
With respect to issues determined in a criminal prosecution:
(1) A judgment in favor of the prosecuting authority is preclusive in favor
of the government:
(a) In a subsequent civil action between the government and the de-
fendant in the criminal prosecution ...
(b) In a subsequent civil action between the government and another
person whose claim is derivative from the defendant ....
(2) A judgment in favor of the prosecuting authority is preclusive in favor
of a third person in a civil action:
(a) Against the defendant in the criminal prosecution ....
(b) Against a person having a relationship with defendant ....
(3) A judgment against the prosecuting authority is preclusive against the
government only under the conditions stated in §§ 27-29 [listing exceptions
and factors to be considered before applying issue preclusion].
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF JUDGMENTS § 85 (1982). For a discussion of the Sec-
ond Restatement's position on the effect of a prior guilty plea in a subsequent civil
action, see note 48 and accompanying text infra.
41. IB MOORE'S FEDERAL PRACTICE, supra note 24, 0.418[l], at 559-60.
While there is a considerable difference of opinion among jurisdictions as to whether
the mutuality requirement must be met before a party in a civil action may invoke
collateral estoppel based on a prior criminal judgment, most courts have retained the
requirement. Id. See, e.g., State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Worthington, 405 F.2d
683 (8th Cir. 1968) (prior conviction based on guilty plea not conclusive of issues in
subsequent suit and may be explained). The Federal Rules of Evidence provide that
evidence of a prior criminal judgment is admissible (but not conclusive) in a subse-
quent civil action so long as the crime was punishable by a prison sentence in excess
of one year or by death. FED. R. EVID. 803(22).
42. See, e.g., Rosenburger v. Northwestern Mut. Life Ins. Co., 182 F. Supp. 633
(D. Kan. 1960) (plaintiff who had been convicted of murdering the insured is collat-
874
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jurisdictions which seem to have abolished the mutuality requirement alto-
gether, any individual is apparently allowed to assert an opposing party's
criminal conviction in subsequent proceedings.
43
The propriety of giving collateral estoppel effect to a criminal convic-
tion entered on a plea of guilty is a particularly controversial matter.4 4 On a
erally estopped from relitigating the issue of his guilt in subsequent action to recover
as beneficiary of insured's policy); Mineo v. The Eureka Sec. Fire & Marine Ins. Co.,
182 Pa. Super. 75, 125 A.2d 612 (1956) (plaintiffs conviction for arson is conclusive
in subsequent suit for fire insurance proceeds). For a discussion of the so-called "ben-
efit exception," see Vestal & Coughenour, supra note 38, at 708-11.
43. See Scooper Dooper, Inc. v. Kraftco Corp., 494 F.2d 840 (3d Cir. 1974). The
question before the Scooper Dooper court was whether, in successive civil antitrust ac-
tions, mutuality of parties is a prerequisite to employment of collateral estoppel. Id.
at 844. The Third Circuit, characterizing itself as being "in the forefront" of the
attack on the doctrine of mutuality, stated:
Provided that the party against whom the plea is asserted has had a full and
fair opportunity to present his claim in the prior litigation, collateral estop-
pel is available as a defense in this Circuit regardless of whether or not the
party asserting the plea was a party (or privy) to the prior litigation.
Id (citations omitted). See also Raiford v. Abney (In re Raiford), 695 F.2d 521, 523
(1 th Cir. 1983) ("mutuality of parties is no longer considered a prerequisite in fed-
eral court to the fair uses of collateral estoppel," even in successive criminal-civil
proceedings) (citing Parklane Hosiery Co. v. Shore, 439 U.S. 322 (1979); Blonder-
Tongue Labs., Inc. v. University Found., 402 U.S. 313 (1971)). For a discussion of
Parklane and Blonder-Tongue, see note 36 supra. See also Wolfson v. Baker, 623 F.2d
1074, 1078 n.2 (5th Cir. 1980) ("in this Circuit, the use of a prior conviction to collat-
erally estop a party in a subsequent action does not depend upon an attempt by that
party to benefit from the crime"), cert. denied, 450 U.S. 966 (1981). See generally Vestal
& Coughenour, supra note 38, at 704-13; Annot., 18 A.L.R. 2d 1287 (1951).
44. See lB MOORE's FEDERAL PRACTICE, supra note 24, 0.418[1], at 557-60. In
practice, the circumstance of successive criminal-civil actions involving a guilty plea
in the first action has not frequently arisen. See Metros v. United States Dist. Court,
441 F.2d 313, 316 (10th Cir. 1971). As a result, there is considerable disagreement as
to the guilty plea's effect on the second action. Compare State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins.
Co. v. Worthington, 405 F.2d 683, 687 (8th Cir. 1968) ("[t]he clear trend of authori-
ties is that evidence of a guilty plea is merely admissible against a party in a subse-
quent civil proceeding but it may be explained and is not conclusive") with United
States v. Schneider, 139 F. Supp. 826, 829 (S.D.N.Y. 1956) ("where the prior convic-
tion resulted from a plea of guilty there would appear to be greater warrant" for
application of collateral estoppel). See also Vestal & Coughenour, supra note 38, at
715 (a conviction upon a guilty plea "normally will be given preclusive effect").
A significant factor in the courts' determination of whether collateral estoppel
should be employed where preclusive effect of a prior guilty plea is sought in a civil
action is whether the guilty pleader had been afforded procedural protections. See De
Cavalcante v. Commissioner, 620 F.2d 23 (3d Cir. 1980). In De Cavalcante, the Third
Circuit examined the question of whether a taxpayer's plea of guilty to illegal gam-
bling activities should have estoppel effect in a subsequent civil action by the govern-
ment for unpaid taxes. Id at 25. Concluding that the lower court had indeed
established a "factual basis" for the plea, and that this plea was made knowingly and
voluntarily according to the requisites of rule 11 of the Federal Rules of Criminal
Procedure, the circuit court held that the plea was preclusive of issues common to
both proceedings. Id at 25 (citing FED. R. CRIM. P. I I(F) (requiring that before a
guilty plea is accepted, the court must satisfy itself that there is a "factual basis" for
the plea)). The United States Supreme Court has admonished that a valid guilty
plea must "not only be voluntary" but must be a "knowing, intelligent act done with
19
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theoretical level, there is disagreement as to whether any issues can be said to
sufficient awareness of the relevant circumstances and likely consequences." Brady v.
United States, 397 U.S. 742, 748 (1970) (footnote omitted). Thus, a significant
number of cases in which collateral estoppel has been invoked against a prior guilty
pleader were so decided only after the court conducted a careful examination of the
record to assure itself that a factual basis for the plea did exist. See, e.g., Raiford v.
Abney (In re Raiford), 695 F.2d 521, 523 (11 th Cir. 1983) (the reason for giving effect
to a judgment based on a guilty plea is that "a federal court cannot enter judgment
upon the plea unless it determines that a factual basis exists for it"); Hernandez-
Uribe v. United States, 515 F.2d 20, 22 (8th Cir. 1975) (since rule 11 procedures
protected the defendant "from an improvident plea of guilty," collateral estoppel is
appropriate in subsequent civil action); Plunkett v. Commissioner, 465 F.2d 299, 306
(7th Cir. 1972) (the criminal court in which the guilty plea was given, fully complied
with the spirit of rule lI's requirements, and therefore defendant's knowing and vol-
untary plea is preclusive). Cf. Greenberg v. Mobil Oil Corp., 318 F. Supp. 1025, 1035
(N.D. Tex. 1970) (collateral estoppel would be unfair since defendant's plea of guilty
is outweighed by his manifest inability to comprehend the gravity of the criminal
proceedings); Mayberry v. Somner, 480 F. Supp. 833, 840 (E.D. Pa. 1979) (the lower
court's "extensive inquiry" into the factual basis for the guilty plea "removes all pos-
sible doubt" regarding employment of collateral estoppel). But see United States v.
$31,697.59 Cash, 665 F.2d 903 (9th Cir. 1982) (although rule 11 requirements were
not met, defendant's guilty plea given preclusive effect since defendant did not avail
himself in a timely manner of the avenues for contesting the conviction such as ap-
peal or collateral attack).
Another factor to which the courts often address themselves in considering the
effect of a prior guilty plea is the identity of the elements of the prior crime with the
issue sought to be precluded in the civil action. See, e.g., Prosise v. Haring, 667 F.2d
1133 (4th Cir. 1981), affd, 103 S. Ct. 2368 (1983). In Prosise, the Fourth Circuit noted
that the majority of decisions finding issue preclusion in guilty pleas "have concerned
issues that represented elements of the crime charged." Id at 1140. This "element-
issue preclusion by guilty plea," the Fourth Circuit said, is in contrast to preclusion of
"non-elemental" issues, such as the legality of the initial arrest or search which led to
the ultimate guilty plea by the defendant. Id The Proszse court held that the plain-
tiff's civil rights action against an arresting officer for illegal search and seizure was
not precluded by his guilty plea to the manufacture of a controlled substance, since
the legality of the search was not an element of the crime to which plaintiff pleaded
guilty. Id. at 1140-41. Similarly, in United States v. Schneider, 139 F. Supp. 826
(S.D.N.Y. 1956), the district court carefully examined the record of the indictment to
which the defendant had pleaded guilty in the prior criminal proceeding before con-
cluding that the plea was preclusive as to those elements common to issues in the
subsequent civil suit by the government. Id at 830. See also Ivers v. United States,
581 F.2d 1362, 1367 (9th Cir. 1978) (collateral estoppel will apply to "each and every
essential element of the crime" to which the plea was entered; Plunkett v. Commis-
sioner, 465 F.2d 299, 306 (7th Cir. 1972) (a guilty plea is a conclusive admission of all
the elements of the formal crime charged); United States v. American Packing Corp.,
113 F. Supp. 223, 225-26 (D.N.J. 1953) (no preclusion since defendant's guilty plea
does not encompass the elements in the subsequent civil charges by the government).
Other courts faced with prior guilty pleas in a subsequent civil action have given
collateral estoppel a broader swathe and have allowed the preclusion of nonelemental
issues as well. See, e.g., Metros v. United States Dist. Court, 441 F.2d 313 (10th Cir.
1971). In Metros, the circuit court held that the plaintiff, who was suing a police
officer under the Civil Rights Act of 1871, was precluded from relitigating the valid-
ity of a search warrant because his guilty plea to unlawful possession of heroin had
already determined that issue. Id at 317. The court stated that "availability of the
challenges to the search is always important" and would have been a "very impor-
tant factor in any consideration of the defense" had the present plaintiff chosen to
litigate rather than plead gulity to the possession charges. Id. For criticism of Metros,
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have been "actually litigated" when a conviction is based on a guilty plea.4 5
Some authority does exist, however, for granting guilty pleas collateral estop-
pel effect where there is mutuality; that is, where in both the criminal and
subsequent civil actions, a private party is pitted against the government.
4 6
see Note, Collateral Estoppel-Efect of Guilty Pleas in Subsequent Civil Actions, 43 U.
COLO. L. REV. 337 (1972). A few other courts have adopted the Metros rule-at least
where, as in Metros itself, there was mutuality of parties. See Brazzell v. Adams, 493
F.2d 489 (5th Cir. 1974) (sale of heroin to which plaintiff had previously pleaded
guilty encompasses and precludes issue of entrapment in subsequent civil rights ac-
tion against police officer); Hooper v. Guthrie, 390 F. Supp. 1327 (W.D. Pa. 1975)
(the issue of unlawful search was "bypassed" and therefore precluded by plaintiff's
prior plea of guilty).
45. Compare Prosise v. Haring, 667 F.2d 1133, 1140 (4th Cir. 1982) (although as
a matter of the rules of evidence, a guilty plea may have preclusive effect, preclusion
by collateral estoppel requires actual litigation), aft'd, 103 S. Ct. 2368 (1982) with
United States v. $31,697.59 Cash, 663 F.2d 903, 906 (9th Cir. 1982) ("appellants are
collaterally estopped from litigating matter disposed of in the criminal case by their
guilty pleas"). The Restatement has taken the position that a plea of guilty should
never have collateral estoppel effect in a later civil proceeding because the plea is
inconsistent with its requirement that an issue be "actually litigated." RESTATE-
MENT (SECOND) OF JUDGMENTS § 85 comment b (1982). The Restatement concedes
that while "a defendant who pleads guilty may be estopped in a subsequent civil
litigation from contesting the facts representing the elements of the offense," such an
estoppel is "a matter of the law of evidence" and not within the scope of collateral
estoppel. Id. Professor Moore has expressed accord with this reasoning. IB
MOORE'S FEDERAL PRACTICE, supra note 24, 0.418[1], at 558. He adds, however,
that this is not the stance taken by many of the courts in actual practice. Id $
0.418[1], at 587. See, e.g., Raiford v. Abney (In re Raiford), 695 F.2d 521, 523 (1 1th
Cir. 1983) (although "disagreement exists, most courts give a judgment based on a
guilty plea the same collateral estoppel effect as any other criminal conviction"); Arc-
tic Ice Cream Co. v. Commissioner, 43 T.C. 68, 75 (1964) (for purposes of collateral
estoppel, there is no difference between a guilty plea and a conviction resulting from
a trial). Thus Professor Moore states that "the generally accepted rule is that a judg-
ment of conviction, based on a plea of guilty, is conclusive in a civil suit between the
same parties of all issues that would have been determined by a conviction after a
contested trial." 1B MOORE'S FEDERAL PRACTICE, supra note 24, 0.418[1], at 557.
If, on the other hand, the same parties are not involved, the "preponderant view" is
that the guilty plea is admissible "only as evidence." Id. For a general discussion of
the "actually litigated" requirement and the opposing views of two commentators,
see Vestal, The Restatement (Second) of Judgments." A Modest Dissent, 66 CORNELL L.
REV. 464, 465 (1981) (criticizing the Restatement's "actually litigated" wording, and
maintaining that there need only have been opportunity to litigate for a guilty plea
to have collateral estoppel effect); Hazard, Revisiting the Second Restatement ofjudgments:
Issue Preclusion and Related Problems, 66 CORNELL L. REV. 564 (1981) (defending the
Restatement's position). See also Note, Preclusive Effect Extended to Guilty Pleas in Subse-
quent Civil Litigation--Ideal Mutual Insurance Co. v. Winker, 68 IowA L. REV. 1331
(1983) (examining the debate between Vestal and the Restatement).
46. See, e.g., Fontneau v. United States, 654 F.2d 8 (1st Cir. 1981) (in civil suit
for tax refund, taxpayer is precluded from relitigating issues encompassed by his
prior guilty plea to tax evasion charges). There appear to be two broad categories in
which most of these cases fall. The first category involves situations in which the
government, as a plaintiff in a civil suit, offensively pleads collateral estoppel on is-
sues involving the defendant's plea of guilty in a prior criminal action. See, e.g., De
Cavalcante v. Commissioner, 620 F.2d 23 (3d Cir. 1980) (in civil action by the I.R.S.
for unpaid taxes, defendant's guilty plea to illegal gambling activities precludes reliti-
gation of these illegalities); Plunkett v. Commissioner, 465 F.2d 299 (7th Cir. 1972)
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But only a few courts have lifted the mutuality strictures to allow a third-
party (non-mutual) civil litigant to invoke collateral estoppel on the basis of
his opponent's prior guilty plea to criminal charges.
4 7
(in civil fraud penalty proceeding, defendant's prior plea of guilty to tax evasion
collaterally estops him from denying that his tax returns were fraudulent).
The second category of collateral estoppel cases which has the combined ele-
ments of mutuality of parties, a prior guilty plea, and a subsequent civil action, in-
volves those situations in which an individual brings suit (often under 42 U.S.C.
§ 1983) against an officer or official who then pleads collateral estoppel on the basis
of the plaintiffs prior plea of guilty. See, e.g., Brazzell v. Adams, 493 F.2d 489 (5th
Cir. 1974) (state prisoner's guilty plea to selling heroin precludes relitigation of issues
in his subsequent action against police for entrapment-the court noting that the
parties met "the mutuality requirement"); Metros v. United States Dist. Court, 441
F.2d 313 (10th Cir. 1971) (in § 1983 suit against police officer, plaintiff's guilty plea
to unlawful possession of heroin precludes him from relitigating the validity of the
search warrant); Mayberry v. Somner, 480 F. Supp. 833 (E.D. Pa. 1979) (inmate's
plea of guilty to charges of murder and assault against prison guard precludes reliti-
gation of plaintiffs guilt in subsequent civil suit against guard for violation of plain-
tiff's civil rights); Hooper v. Guthrie, 390 F. Supp. 1327 (W.D. Pa. 1975) (plaintiff's
plea of guilty for passing worthless checks works as collateral estoppel in subsequent
§ 1983 action against officer for unlawful arrest). But see Prosise v. Haring, 677 F.2d
1133, 1141 (4th Cir. 1981) (court denies estoppel effect to plaintiff's prior guilty plea,
stating that as to § 1983 actions "we believe a general rule of non-preclusion should
obtain with respect to search and seizure issues in guilty plea cases"), aft'd, 103 S. Ct.
2368 (1983).
47. See Nathan v. Tenna Corp., 560 F.2d 761 (7th Cir. 1977). In Nathan, the
Seventh Circuit permitted the defensive use of collateral estoppel where mutuality
was lacking. Id at 763. The plaintiff, a manufacturer's representative, sued his for-
mer employer to recover commissions allegedly due him. Id. at 762. The court gave
preclusive effect to the plaintiffs prior guilty plea to federal mail fraud charges for
commission-splitting, since there was a clear identity of issues between the criminal
and civil actions. d at 763-64. The court did not explicitly place this case under the
generally accepted "benefit" exception to the mutuality of parties requirement,
wherein a party who attempts to profit from his guilt will be precluded from so doing
in a later civil suit, even in the absence of mutuality of parties. For a discussion of the
benefit exception, see note 42 and accompanying text supra. See also Raiford v. Abney
(In re Raiford), 695 F.2d 521 (11 th Cir. 1983). In Raiford, the Eleventh Circuit per-
mitted the offensive (plaintiffs) use of collateral estoppel based on the defendant's
prior guilty plea despite the absence of mutuality of parties. Id. The defendant had
earlier pleaded guilty in a criminal action to the felony of knowingly and fraudu-
lently making a false oath or account in a bankruptcy proceeding. Id. at 522. In a
subsequent civil suit initiated by the trustee in bankruptcy, the defendant was collat-
erally estopped from denying the fraudulent acts to which he had previously pleaded
guilty. Id at 524. The circuit court unequivocally stated that "mutuality of parties is
no longer considered a prerequisite in federal court to the fair use of collateral estop-
pel." Id at 523 (citing Parklane Hosiery Co. v. Shore, 438 U.S. 322 (1979); Blonder-
Tonguc Labs., Inc. v. University Found., 402 U.S. 313 (1971)). For further discussion
of Parklane and Blonder-Tongue and the concept of mutuality of parties, see note 36
supra.
Other courts faced with the use of a prior guilty plea in a civil action in which
mutuality is absent have either denied or not discussed collateral estoppel; permitting
the plea to serve only an evidentiary function. See, e.g., Eschelbach v. Scull, 293 F.2d
599 (3d Cir. 1961). In Eschelbach, the Third Circuit permitted introduction of the
plaintiff's prior guilty plea to the traffic offense of careless driving, as evidence of
contributory negligence in his automobile negligence action. Id at 602-03. See also
Rain v. Pavkov, 357 F.2d 506 (3d Cir. 1966). In Rain, the Third Circuit stated, "It is
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Another critical question in the guilty plea-collateral estoppel context is
whether the guilty pleader had had adequate incentive to litigate the crimi-
nal charges. 48 In this regard, most courts will at least consider the serious-
ness of the crime and its penalty when making their determinations.
49
the general rule that a plea of guilty to a charge of reckless driving is an admission
against interest, and evidence thereof is admissible in an action for personal injuries
based upon the same facts and circumstance from which the charge arose." Id at
509. See also State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Worthington, 405 F.2d 683, 686 (8th
Cir. 1968) (insured's guilty plea to manslaughter, although admissible, has no preclu-
sive effect in later suit by victim's family against insurer to recover judgment secured
against insured); Breeding v. Massey, 378 F.2d 171 (8th Cir. 1967) (defendant's guilty
plea to drunken driving is admissible as a declaration against interest if the offense is
directly related to plaintiff's negligence action); Levell v. Powers, 248 F.2d 774 (10th
Cir. 1957) (guilty plea to traffic offense is competent evidence in negligence action
based on the same occurrence). See generally Note, Admissions By Parties and Privies, 74
HARV. L. REv. 1452 (1961) (only a minority of jurisdictions deem prior criminal
conviction admissible as evidence in a civil action).
48. See, e.g., Greenburg v. Mobil Oil Corp., 318 F. Supp. 1025 (N.D. Tex. 1970).
In Greenburg, the district court refused to give estoppel effect to the defendant's plea of
guilty to assault with intent to murder. Id at 1035. The court noted that the defend-
ant's lawyer had threatened to withdraw from the case unless defendant either paid
him his fee or entered a guilty plea. Id. The court concluded that these circum-
stances, coupled with the defendant's relative naivete, suggested an understandable
diminution of his incentive to litigate the charges. Id. at 1036. See also State Farm
Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Worthington, 405 F.2d 683, 685 (8th Cir. 1968) (since defend-
ant's plea of guilty to manslaughter was predicated in part upon the lynch-mob tem-
per of the community and the defendant's fear for his safety, sufficient incentive to
litigate was lacking and his plea had no preclusive effect).
It is interesting to note that while Professor Vestal deems "opportunity and in-
centive to litigate" of singular importance to the doctrine of collateral estoppel, he
would normally give all guilty pleas preclusive effect with the proviso that the party
be permitted to show relevant facts surrounding the plea. See Vestal & Coughenour,
supra note 38, at 715. But see Hazard, supra note 45 (suggesting that Professor Vestal's
treatment of guilty pleas would convert option to litigate into compulsion to litigate).
For a discussion of these varying views, see Prosise v. Haring, 667 F.2d 1133 (4th Cir.
1981), aftd, 103 S. Ct. 2368 (1983). For a discussion of the holding of Prosise, see note
44 supra. For a discussion of the "actually litigated" requirement as it relates to the
doctrine of collateral estoppel in general, see note 26 and accompanying text supra.
49. See Teitelbaum Furs, Inc. v. Dominion Ins. Co., 58 Cal. 2d 601, 375 P.2d
439, 25 Cal. Rptr. 559 (1962). In Teitelbaum, Justice Traynor asserted his view that a
guilty plea to charges should not have collateral estoppel effect since such a plea
"may reflect only a compromise or a belief that paying a fine is more advantageous
than litigation." Id at 605-06, 375 P.2d at 441, 25 Cal. Rptr. at 561. See also Note,
supra note 47, at 1452 (it is "common experience that people plead guilty to traffic
charges for reasons of expediency"). Cf Brady v. United States, 397 U.S. 742, 752
(1970) (discussing various motives for pleading guilty other than actual guilt).
In Raiford, the court concluded that sufficient incentive to litigate was estab-
lished where the defendant had pleaded guilty to a felony-grade crime. Raiford v.
Abney (In re Raiford), 695 F.2d 521, 524 (1 1th Cir. 1983). Dismissing the defendant's
argument that he had pleaded so because of promises of a lighter sentence, the court
observed that the defendant "still had a great deal to lose by pleading guilty, "since
he would always carry a felony record with him." Id. This, the court reasoned, "is
not a simple misdemeanor in which impact is often minimal." Id. For the same
reasons, the drafters of the Federal Rules of Evidence limited the hearsay exception
for records of criminal convictions to those with a penalty exceeding one year. See
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The Supreme Court has not addressed the question of whether the col-
lateral estoppel effect of a guilty plea conviction may be asserted by a third
party in a subsequent civil action.50 However, in Emt-h Motors Corp. o. General
Motors Corp., the Court did stress that the preclusive significance of contested
criminal convictions may only be asserted by careful scrutiny of the trial
record, 5 1 and proffered specific instructions as to how a trial judge must pro-
ceed before precluding an issue from being litigated. 52 The Third Circuit,
too, has also emphasized that close examination of the entire record of the
FED. R. EvID. 803(22) advisory committee note (unlike with felonies, the motivation
to defend misdemeanor charges is often minimum or nonexistent).
50. See Prosise v. Haring, 667 F.2d 1133 (4th Cir. 1981) (reviewing Supreme
Court decisions regarding collateral estoppel and finding none apposite to the ques-
tion of collateral estoppel effect of guilty pleas), affd, 103 S. Ct. 2368 (1983).
51. 340 U.S. 558, 569 (1951). In Emich, a former dealer of Chevrolets sued Gen-
eral Motors under § 4 of the Clayton Act to recover treble damages for injuries sus-
tained as a result of General Motors' alleged conspiracy to monopolize the financing
of its automobiles. Id at 559. Because General Motors had been criminally con-
victed for conspiracy regarding the same transaction, Emich sought to preclude reliti-
gation of the conspiracy issue. Id. at 564. In addressing this matter and its proper
application under this statute, the Court stated that "[tJhe evidentiary use which
may be made under § 4 [of the Clayton Act] of the prior conviction of respondents is
thus to be determined by reference to the general doctrine of estoppel." Id at 568
(citing 15 U.S.C. § 16 (1976)). Thus, the Court stated, since estoppel only extends
"to questions distinctly put in issue and directly determined," scrutiny of the prior
record is imperative. Id at 569. The Emich Court remanded the case, with directions
that the court below examine the entire record, including the pleadings, the evidence
submitted, the jury instructions and any opinions of the court, to determine what
precisely was decided by the criminal judgment. Id.
52. Id at 572. The Court stated,
[T]he trial judge should (1) examine the record of the antecedent case to
determine the issues decided by the judgment; (2) in his instructions to the
jury reconstruct that case in the manner and to the extent he deems neces-
sary to acquaint the jury fully with the issues determined therein; and
(3) explain the scope and effect of the former judgment on the case at trial.
Id
Cases which have cited Emich for the proper application of collateral estoppel to
a prior conviction include the following: Chisholm v. Defense Logistics Agency, 656
F.2d 42, 48 (3d Cir. 1981); Wolfson v. Baker, 623 F.2d 1074 (5th Cir. 1980), cert.
denied, 405 U.S. 966 (1981); De Cavalcante v. Commissioner, 620 F.2d 23, 28 (3d Cir.
1980); United States v. Podell, 572 F.2d 31 (3d Cir. 1978); Kauffman v. Moss, 420
F.2d 1270, 1274 (3d Cir. 1970); Metros v. United States Dist. Court, 441 F.2d 313,
316 (10th Cir. 1970); United States v. Fabric Garment Co., 366 F.2d 530, 533 (2d Cir.
1966). See also Sartin v. Commissioner of Pub. Safety, 535 F.2d 430, 433 n.4 (8th Cir.
1976) (collateral estoppel could not have been invoked since "it [was] impossible to
determine from the record what issues of fact were actually litigated and deter-
mined"); Williams v. Liberty, 461 F.2d 325, 327 (7th Cir. 1972) ("lacking a certified
copy of the transcript we are uninformed as to which of plaintiff's acts furnished the
foundation for his conviction"); United States v. Friedland, 391 F.2d 378, 382 (2d
Cir. 1968) (since the party claiming estoppel did not present the transcript of the
prior trial "there is no basis for ascertaining what issues were determined"), cert. de-
nied, 404 U.S. 914 (1971); Hyman v. Regenstein, 258 F.2d 502, 511 (5th Cir. 1958)
("collateral estoppel by judgment is applicable only when it is evident from the
pleadings and record that determination of the fact in question was necessary to the
final judgment").
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criminal trial is a prerequisite to granting collateral estoppel effect to a
conviction.
53
The question of whether a casino policy against card counting can be
the basis of a conviction for criminal trespass has not been conclusively de-
53. See, e.g., Chisholm v. Defense Logistics Agency, 656 F.2d 42 (3d Cir. 1981).
In Chisholm, the Third Circuit, in deciding that collateral estoppel would not be ap-
plied against the defendant's prior criminal conviction, refused to forego the require-
ment of examination of the criminal trial record even though the offense was
statutory. Id at 50. Judge Hunter, in his dissent, argued that the trial record should
not be necessary where all of the elements of the crime are contained in the statute
and there is a conviction under that statute. Id. at 52 (Hunter, J., dissenting). How-
ever, the majority held that collateral estoppel must not be employed without a thor-
ough examination of the pleadings and transcript of the criminal trial-neither of
which had been introduced at the civil proceeding. Id at 49. The majority reasoned
that the record was necessary to determine whether the statutory offense of "striking,
beating, or wounding" encompassed the civil allegations of "shoving and striking."
Id.
In Kaujinan v. Moss, the Third Circuit reaffirmed that a proponent of collateral
estoppel must present a full record of the criminal proceedings to the trial court.
Kauffman v. Moss, 420 F.2d 1270, 1275 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 400 U.S. 846 (1970).
The plaintiff, who had been previously convicted of conspiracy to commit burglary
and larceny, sued certain law enforcement officers for conspiring to secure his convic-
tion by knowingly using perjured testimony. Id at 1281-82. The Third Circuit va-
cated the district court's dismissal of the suit because that court had improperly
relied on collateral estoppel. Id at 1272. The Kauffman court stated that the veracity
of witnesses cannot be assumed to have been adequately put in issue at the criminal
trial, even where a conviction resulted, unless it was clearly shown by the trial record.
Id at 1275. Thus, the court admonished the district court for failing to examine the
record of the state trial before reaching its decision to apply collateral estoppel. Id
(citing Emich Motors Corp. v. General Motors Corp., 340 U.S. 558 (1951)). For a
discussion of Emt'ch, see notes 51-52 and accompanying text supra. In a footnote, the
Kauffman court noted that the principles expressed in this opinion should apply
whether the issue is one concerning the truthfulness of witnesses, "or . . . other mat-
ters, such as search and seizure, assault and battery and the like. In our view, a guilty
verdict per se no more establishes the veracity of every witness than it determines
which of several alternative factual combinations the jury believed." Id. at 1275 n.10.
See also Basista v. Weir, 340 F.2d 74 (3d Cir. 1965). In Baststa, the Third Circuit
held that a full record of the criminal conviction must be introduced and considered
before a court may conclude that the lawfulness of the underlying arrest had been
litigated and determined. Id at 81-82. Basista had been convicted of assault and
battery upon two police officers who had arrested him at his home for disorderly
conduct. Id at 77-78. He then initiated a suit against the officers under the Civil
Rights Act, 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1982). Id at 78-79. The defendants affirmatively
pleaded that Basista's prior conviction collaterally estopped relitigation of the lawful-
ness of his arrest and detention. Id. at 81. The district court granted a judgment
n.o.v. for the defendants. Id. On appeal, the Third Circuit held that since no tran-
script of the criminal trial record had been presented at the trial below, evidence of
Basista's prior indictment and conviction was not sufficient to establish precisely
which issues had been actually litigated and determined. Id at 81-82. The Third
Circuit tersely reasoned, "[Tihe transcript of the proceedings of Basista's trial before
the Court of Quarter Sessions was not admitted in evidence and therefore there could
be no collateral estoppel." Id. The court explained that "[h1acking a certified copy of
the transcript we are uninformed as to what acts of Basista furnished the foundation
for his conviction . . . ." Id at 81-82.
1983-84]
25
Harrison: Civil Procedure - A Prior Guilty Plea Is Sufficient to Raise and
Published by Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law Digital Repository, 1984
VILLANOVA LAW REVIEW
termined under New Jersey law. 54 In Uson v. Resorts International Hotel, Inc., 55
the New Jersey Supreme Court held that regulatory legislation governing
the casino industry precluded casinos from exercising the common law right
of an amusement-place owner to exclude patrons.5 6 The court further rea-
soned that because the Casino Control Commission has exclusive authority
over the rules and permitted methods of gambling, a casino owner may not
exclude persons simply because they employ an otherwise permitted gam-
bling technique, such as card counting.57 Thus, although casino patrons
54. See Uston v. Resorts Int'l Hotel, Inc., 89 N.J. 163, 168, 445 A.2d 370, 372
(1982) ("we feel constrained to refute. . . that absent supervening statutes, the owners
of places open to the public enjoy an absolute right to exclude patrons without good
cause") (emphasis added). The essence of criminal "defiant" trespass is the absence
of a right to be on the premises. For an excerpt of the New Jersey defiant trespass
statute, see note 5 supra. For a discussion of Uston, see notes 11 supra & 56-57 and
accompanying text thfta.
55. 89 N.J. 163, 445 A.2d 370 (1980).
56. Id at 166, 445 A.2d at 371. Uston was a professional blackjack player who
was well known as a card counter. Id Soon after Uston began playing at its casino,
Resorts International Hotel (Resorts) solicited advice from the Casino Control Com-
mission (Commission) as to whether it had the right to exclude professional card
counters. Id at 167, 445 A.2d at 372. Upon receiving the Commission's reply that no
statute prevented casinos from. so acting, Resorts barred Uston from its casino and
subsequently instituted procedures for identifying and excluding all card counters.
Id. at 167, 455 A.2d at 372. Uston appealed Resorts' action to the Commission which
upheld Resorts' common law right to exclude any person with or without cause. Id
at 167, 445 A.2d at 372. On appeal, the New Jersey Superior Court reversed, holding
that since the Commission had the sole authority to designate persons to be excluded
from casinos, and since the Commission had not yet exercised its authority with re-
gard to card counters, the individual casinos were precluded from asserting their
common law rights to exclude alleged card counters. Uston v. Resorts Int'l Hotel,
Inc., 179 N.J. Super. 223, 431 A.2d 173 (1981).
On appeal, the New Jersey Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the Casino
Control Act "gives the Commission exclusive authority to set the rules of licensed
casino games which includes the methods for playing those games. The Casino Con-
trol Act therefore precludes Resorts from excluding Uston for card counting." 89
N.J. at 166, 445 A.2d at 371 (citing N.J. STAT. ANN. §§ 5:12-1 to -152 (West Supp.
1983)). The court added that because the Commission had not yet determined
whether card counters should be excluded, "we do not decide whether such an exclu-
sion would be lawful." Id at 166, 445 A.2d at 371.
Prior to Uston, it was generally recognized that a patron of an amusement estab-
lishment merely had a revocable license to enter, and that the proprietor had a right
to exclude any individual for any reason. See Garifine v. Monmouth Park Jockey
Club, 29 N.J. 47, 148 A.2d 1 (1959) (surveying the majority rule in the United States
on the common law right to exclude). For further discussion of the right to exclude,
see Turner & Kennedy, Exclusion, Ej4ection and Segregation of Theater Patrons, 32 IowA L.
REV. 625 (1947); Wade, What is A License?, 64 L.Q. REv. 57 (1948); Annot., 90
A.L.R. 3d 1361 (1979); Annot., 1 A.L.R. 2d 1165 (1948).
57. Uston, 89 N.J. at 166, 445 A.2d at 372-73. The New Jersey Supreme Court
in Uston emphasized the breadth of the Commission's statutory authority over the
playing of blackjack. Id at 168-69, 445 A.2d at 372-73 (citing N.J. STAT. ANN. 5:12-
100 and 5:12-70). Additionally, the court noted the Commission's promulgation of
"exhuastive rules" which "cover every conceivable aspect of the game." Id at 169,
445 A.2d at 373. As a result, the Uston court stated, "[T]he Commission's regulation
of blackjack is more extensive than the entire administrative regulation of many in-
dustries." Id a: 169, 455 A.2d at 373. Thus, because the Commission had exclusive
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have a mere revocable license to remain on the premises, Uson indicates
significant limitations on an owner's right to eject, exclude, or arrest patrons
for impermissible reasons. 58
authority to exclude card counters from the playing of blackjack and because no
regulations on that matter had been issued, "Resorts had no right to exclude Uston
on grounds that he successfully plays the game under existing rules." Id. at 169-70,
445 A.2d at 373.
It is interesting to note that the New Jersey Supreme Court decision in Uson had
been decided one month after the Prne district court trial (held April 1-2, 1982), but
prior to Prinz's Third Circuit appeal (heard January 6, 1983, and decided April 28,
1983). In his instructions to the jury the Prinz district court judge may have been
relying upon the Uston superior court decision, although he made no specific cita-
tions. The district trial judge adopted virtually identical reasoning to that of the
Uston superior court decision stating that even though Greate Bay had ejected Prinz
on statutory rather than common law grounds,
[T]his authority having been vested solely in the Commission, an individual
casino is not empowered to blacklist or exclude a person .... The Com-
mission itself has not adopted any regulation excluding card counters.
Therefore, card counters, under the law of New Jersey may not be excluded
from a casino by virtue of being a card counter.
Prinz, AA at 234a-235a. For a further discussion of the district judge's ruling in Prinz,
see note 11 supra.
58. 89 N.J. 163, 445 A.2d 370. In a case decided two months after Uson,
Marzocca v. Ferrone, the state superior court stated that the Uston decision "is solely
based upon a modification of the common law exclusionary rule, . . . [so as to] in-
voke a reasonable rule of exclusion to be determined in the facts of each case."
Marzocca v. Ferrone, 186 N.J, Super. 483, 453 A.2d 228, 234 (1982) (citing Uson, 89
N.J. 163, 445 A.2d 370). In Marzocca, the plaintiff, a horseowner, sought a restraining
order against a raceway association to prevent its barring him from racing his horses
at a particular track. 186 N.J. Super. at 486, 453 A.2d at 229. Applying the Uston
reasoning, the superior court remanded for a determination of whether the plaintiff's
common law right to pursue his business without unlawful or unreasonable hin-
drance is superceded by the raceway association's common law right to exclude. Id.
at 493, 496, 453 A.2d at 234-35. The court explicitly noted that since only counter-
vailing common law rights were at issue, the Uson decision was applicable. Id at
493, 453 A.2d at 234.
In a case which was decided after the Uson superior court decision, but before
the New Jersey Supreme Court decision, the New Jersey superior court was faced
with the question of whether a casino has the right to detain (rather than exclude) a
suspected card counter in order to question him. Bartolo v. Boardwalk Regency Ho-
tel Casino, Inc., 185 N.J. Super. 534, 449 A.2d 1339 (1982). In Bartolo, two security
guards for the defendant casino had grabbed the four plaintiffs by the arms and
collars and pulled them away from a blackjack table. d at 535, 449 A.2d at 1340. A
casino games manager then ordered them to produce identification so that they could
be registered and prevented from playing blackjack. Id Upon threat of arrest, the
plaintiffs complied and were then directed to leave. Id Plaintiffs then filed suit
against the casino, alleging, among other things, false imprisonment. Id at 536, 449
A.2d at 1340. The casino argued that it had a right and immunity to detain sus-
pected card counters by pointing to a provision in the Casino Control Act which
permits a casino to briefly detain individuals who are suspected of cheating. Id at
539, 449 A.2d at 1343 (citing N.J. STAT. ANN. § 5:12-121(b) (West Supp. 1983)). The
Bartolo court rejected the defendant's argument, stating that "there is no basis upon
which card counting can be viewed as cheating or swindling a casino . . . ." Id at
540, 449 A.2d at 1343. Thus, the court concluded, "Absent any affirmative statutory
authorization to detain suspected card counters, the plaintiff's version of the incident
at the Boardwalk Regency would constitute false imprisonment." Id
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Against this background, the Third Circuit considered whether a de-
fendant on appeal may assert the collateral estoppel effect of the plaintiffs
prior guilty plea, when at the trial level that defendant did not plead collat-
eral estoppel as an affirmative defense nor did it introduce any record of the
criminal conviction. 59
Judge Gibbons, writing for the majority, began by identifying the com-
peting arguments advanced by the parties on appeal. 60 Greate Bay argued
that Prinz's guilty plea to the charge of defiant trespass estopped him from
contending that he had a right to remain in the casino on the night in ques-
tion.6' Therefore, Greate Bay continued, its casino staff had probable cause
to detain Prinz-a defense to a charge of false imprisonment in New
Jersey. 62 In response, Prinz argued, based on Federal Rule 8(c), 63 that
Greate Bay had waived the affirmative defense of collateral estoppel by fail-
ing to plead it in the district court.64
Judge Gibbons acknowledged that rule 8(c) generally requires that an
affirmative defense be pleaded at trial or else it is unavailable on appeal. 6
5
However, he continued, where the issues are tried by the express or implied
consent of the parties, rule 15(b) 66 provides an exception to the pleading
59. See 705 F.2d 692 (3d Cir. 1983). Specifically, the Third Circuit was called
upon to determine whether Prinz was collaterally estopped from asserting false im-
prisonment charges against Greate Bay on the basis of his prior guilty plea and con-
viction for trespass on Greate Bay's casino premises. Id at 694. For a discussion of
the events leading to the trespass conviction and the subsequent false imprisonment
charges, see notes 1-9 and accompanying text supra.
60. 705 F.2d at 694.
61. Id Greate Bay argued that the trial judge had improperly allowed the "jury
to consider Prinz's right to be on the casino premises notwithstanding Prinz's plea of
guilty to being a trespasser. Id. The trial judge's instructions to the jury are ex-
cerpted in note 11 supra.
62. 705 F.2d at 694. The right of casino owners to exclude individuals from
their premises is discussed in notes 54-55 and accompanying text supra. The Third
Circuit majority did not directly address the status of New Jersey law on this issue,
but commented that "[tlhe law was far from certain." 705 F.2d at 694 n.2 (citing
Uston v. Resorts Int'l Hotel, Inc., 89 N.J. 163, 445 A.2d 370 (1982)). For a discussion
of the Uson decision, see notes 55-57 and accompanying text supra. The Prbtz major-
ity agreed with Greate Bay's statement that Prinz's guilty plea established 1) that he
had no right to remain at the casino, and 2) the casino therefore had probable cause
to detain him. See 705 F.2d at 694 ("probable cause for [plaintiff's] detention is a
crucial element of the defense" to a charge of false imprisonment under New Jersey
law). Judge Higginbotham's dissent takes issue with the majority's reasoning. See
notes 77-78 and accompanying text infra.
63. 705 F.2d at 694. For the full text and discussion of rule 8(c), see note 16 and
accompanying text supra.
64. 705 F.2d at 694.
65. Id. (citing Sartin v. Commissioner of Pub. Safety, 535 F.2d 430, 433 (8th Cir.
1976)). For a discussion of Sartin in particular, and the consequences of failure to
plead an affirmative defense in general, see note 16 and accompanying text supra.
66. 705 F.2d at 694. The text of the majority opinion actually refers to rule
"15(c)." Id. at 694-95. However, this is apparently a typographical error, as Judge
Higginbotham suggests in his dissent. See id at 696 n.1 (Higginbotham, J.,
dissenting).
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requirement of 8(c). 67 If the issues underlying an affirmative defense were in
fact tried below without objection, Judge Gibbons stated, then the defense
should be treated as if it had been raised in the pleadings.
68
In analyzing whether the collateral estoppel issue had been tried by the
consent of the parties, the majority pointed out that Greate Bay had alleged
the facts underlying the defense of collateral estoppel in its answer.6 9 Judge
Gibbons noted that Greate Bay had also mentioned Prinz's conviction in
two motions for a directed verdict and in a timely request for charge.70
Moreover, Greate Bay had elicited testimony from Prinz admitting the
guilty plea, with no objection from Prinz's counsel. 71 Given this "totality of
67. 705 F.2d at 694. For a discussion of rule 15(b) and the criteria for determin-
ing if a matter has been litigated by the implied consent of the parties, see notes 17-23
and accompanying text supra.
68. 705 F.2d at 694. Judge Gibbons borrowed Professor Moore's explanation of
the interplay of rules 8(c) and 15(b): " 'If an affirmative defense is not pleaded it is
waived to the extent that the party which should have pleaded the affirmative de-
fense may not introduce evidence in support thereof, unless the adverse party makes
no objection in which case the issues are enlarged .... ' " Id (quoting 2A MOORE'S
FEDERAL PRACTICE, 8.27[3], 8-251, 8-253 (2d ed. 1981)). Judge Gibbons added,
"The rule is particularly applicable where, as here, the facts underlying the affirma-
tive defense have been pleaded." 705 F.2d at 694 (citing Federal Sav. & Loan Ins.
Corp. v. Hogan, 476 F.2d 1182, 1186 (7th Cir. 1973)). For a statement of Hogan's
holding, see note 22 supra.
69. 705 F.2d at 693, 695. Judge Gibbons referred to Greate Bay's allegations
that Prinz had been detained for arrest and subsequently convicted of defiant tres-
pass. Id. "Thus," Judge Gibbons continued, "Greate Bay alleged facts which would
bar Prinz's false imprisonment claim by virtue of collateral estoppel." Id at 693
(citing Kauffman v. Moss, 420 F.2d 1270, 1274 (3d Cir. 1970); United States v.
Schneider, 139 F. Supp. 826, 829 (S.D.N.Y. 1956)). For a discussion of Kauffman, see
note 52 supra. For a discussion of Schneider, see notes 44 & 46 supra. The pertinent
portions of Greate Bay's answer are set forth at note 9 supra.
70. 705 F.2d at 695. The relevant portions of Greate Bay's motions for a di-
rected verdict and request for charge are set forth in note 11 supra.
71. 705 F.2d at 693. Greate Bay raised the issue of his guilty plea in its cross
examination of Prinz:Q. Now concerning the Atlantic City Policy Department, the charges
there, you pleaded guilty to those charges, didn't you?
A. That's correct, sir.
Id. (quoting AA at 58a). Prinz's counsel made no objection to this question and in
fact, during the redirect examination of Prinz, asked him to explain why he had
pleaded guilty. 705 F.2d at 695-96 (Higginbotham, J., dissenting) (citing AA at 62a).
Prinz described the circumstances surrounding his guilty plea as follows:
A. Well, like I said, I was taken to the police station around midnight and
I was ushered off into the cell. I was there for the morning. The after-
noon went by. I still didn't hear anything. Finally, they took us to this
room, handcuffed us, took us up to this courtroom with the public
defendant-
Q. Public defender.
A. Public defender approached me and told me that my best bet, you
know, is to plead guilty and they would give me a $25 fine.
Q. Do you feel you were guilty?
A. No, I didn't feel that I was guilty of anything, but as I said before, I
was detained for 19, 20 hours and in a situation I had never been in
and my main objective was to get my freedom again.
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circumstances," the majority concluded that the preclusive effect of Prinz's
prior conviction had in fact been tried by the consent of the parties, and that
this brought into play rule 15(b)'s exception to the general pleading require-
ments of rule 8(c). 72 Thus, because the jury erroneously had been allowed to
determine the issue of Prinz's right to be in the casino, the majority re-
manded the case for a new trial.
73
Judge Higginbotham filed a dissenting opinion in which he criticized
the majority for reversing the district court on an issue that he contended
had been neither pleaded nor properly presented at trial.
74
First, Judge Higginbotham pointed out that Greate Bay had not met
the procedural burden imposed by rule 8(c) of pleading the affirmative de-
fense of collateral estoppel. 75 Further, he stated that the majority's conclu-
sion that the issue had actually been tried by consent of the parties was a
misinterpretation of rule 15(b). 76 In Judge Higginbotham's view, the fact
72. 705 F.2d at 695. Judge Gibbons summarized as follows:
Here the facts on which the defense of collateral estoppel rests were pleaded
in the answer. They were introduced in evidence without objection. They
were called to the court's attention in a motion for directed verdict, which
was renewed at the end of the entire case. They were the subject of a timely
request for charge . . . . In this totality of circumstances Rule 15(c) [sic]
rather than Rule 8(c) provides the appropriate frame of reference.
Id at 694-95.
73. Id at 695. An additional factor cited by Judge Gibbons in support of the
result was that "Prinz does not suggest that he has any evidence which might have
been offered to overcome the collateral estoppel effect of his guilty plea.".ld The
majority opinion does not indicate what sort of evidence it would require, or whether
this evidence would be properly received by an appellate court in the first instance.
See id
74. 705 F.2d at 695 (Higginbotham, J., dissenting). Judge Higginbotham sum-
marized his reasons for dissenting as follows:
In this case the trial judge will be reversed because of the operation of an
affirmative defense which defendant's counsel failed to articulate in his
pleadings, during the course of trial or in his post trial motions. Defend-
ant's counsel . . .also failed to offer into evidence the complaint on which
the prior action was based and the record of the prior proceeding in order
to demonstrate the propriety of its application to bar plaintiff's false impris-
onment claim.
Id
75. Id at 696 (Higginbotham, J., dissenting). The dissent noted that Greate
Bay did not affirmatively plead collateral estoppel, nor did it use the term "estoppel"
in its answer, in any amendment to its answer, or in its motions for a directed verdict.
Id On the other hand, Judge Higginbotham pointed out, Greate Bay had used the
term at least 12 times on appeal. Id at 698 (Higginbotham, J., dissenting). Judge
Higginbotham examined what he termed the "glaringly defective" answer submitted
by Greate Bay: "[Djefendant's counsel filed an answer which was clouded with error,
imprecision and ambiguity." Id at 697 (Higginbotham, J., dissenting). Greate Bay's
answer is excerpted at note 9 supra. Judge Higginbotham remarked that the answer
appeared to indicate a decision to defend by litigating the false imprisonment issue
rather than by pleading collateral estoppel as an affirmative defense. 705 F.2d at 698
(Higginbothani, J., dissenting).
76. Id Judge Higginbotham suggested that the majority misapplied rule 15(b)
when it concluded that the mere introduction of otherwise relevant factual matter
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that Prinz's counsel did not object to evidence which arguably could have
been the basis of a collateral estoppel assertion, was not sufficient to establish
implied consent to litigate that issue.7 7 Because neither the ,rial court nor
the plaintiff had any notice that this unpleaded defense was being asserted,
Judge Higginbotham concluded that there had been no consent to litigate
and that rule 15(b) was therefore inapplicable.78
In addition to Greate Bay's procedural default, the dissent pointed to
the casino's failure to meet the substantive burden imposed on a proponent of
collateral estoppel-that of demonstrating the propriety of employing the
doctrine in the present case. 79 Judge Higginbotham cited Supreme Court
decisions requiring a trial judge to carefully evaluate evidence of a prior
proceeding before deciding that an earlier determination should preclude
relitigation of an issue.80 Because Greate Bay had not produced a record of
the trespass conviction or even a copy of the complaint, the dissent argued
without objection can establish implied consent to litigate an unpleaded affirmative
defense. Id See note 77 infra.
77. 705 F.2d at 698-99 (Higginbotham, J., dissenting). Judge Higginbotham
recognized that Prinz's counsel would have been entitled to object to Greate Bay's
introduction of evidence in support of an unpleaded affirmative defense under rule
15(b). Id However, he felt that the majority had improperly concluded that evi-
dence that Prinz had pleaded guilty to defiant trespass was clearly identifiable as the
basis for a defense of collateral estoppel:
The evidence indicates only that appellee agreed to litigate ony the issue
raised during the course of litigation; that is, whether defendant had falsely
imprisoned him. The mere existence of facts which arguably could have
served as the basis for alleging another claim is insufficient proof that appel-
lee had impliedly consented to litigate this other claim.
Id at 699 (Higginbotham, J., dissenting).
78. Id. at 698 (Higginbotham, J., dissenting). The dissent stated that it was
particularly important that notice of the collateral defense be clear in this case, since
it is not immediately obvious that a false impisonment charge would involve the
same issues as a conviction for defiant trespass. Id. Judge Higginbotham asserted,
"No New Jersey case states or even suggests that a guilty plea to or conviction of the
crime of defiant trespass estops a false imprisonment claim." Id. Thus, he concluded,
it would impose an "unnecessary and unrealistic burden" on the trial judge to expect
him to infer that this is the defense being raised. Id
79. Id. at 699 (Higginbotham, J., dissenting) (citing Chisholm v. Defense Logis-
tics Agency, 656 F.2d 42, 50 (3d Cir. 1981); Scooper Dooper, Inc. v. Kraftco Corp.,
494 F.2d 840 (3d Cir. 1974)). For a discussion of Chisholm, see note 53 supra. For
discussion of relevant aspects of Scooper Dooper, see notes 31 & 36-37 supra. Judge
Higginbotham recognized 3 elements necessary to demonstrate that collateral estop-
pel is appropriate: 1) the issues in the prior and subsequent actions must be identical;
2) the issues must have been actually litigated in the prior actions; and 3) the issue
must have been necessary to the prior judgment. 705 F.2d at 699 (Higginbotham, J.,
dissenting) (citing Scooper Dooper, 494 F.2d at 844; Brighthart v. McKay, 420 F.2d 242
(D.C. Cir. 1969); Roth v. McAllister Bros., Inc., 316 F.2d 143 (2d Cir. 1963)). For a
further discussion of these elements, see notes 25-28 and accompanying text supra.
80. 705 F.2d at 699 (Higginbotham, J., dissenting) (citing Emich Motors Corp.
v. General Motors Corp., 340 U.S. 558, 569 (1959) (quoting Frank v. Mangum, 237
U.S. 309 (1915)) (in order to have collateral estoppel effect, the matter must have
been " 'distinctly put in issue and directly determined' " in the criminal
prosecution)).
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that the result reached by the majority contravened binding precedent.8 '
To support his conclusion, Judge Higginbotham cited Third Circuit case
law establishing as an "essential" requirement that a party seeking to assert
the preclusive effect of an antecedent criminal judgment introduce an ade-
quate record thereof.82 He criticized the "conclusory reasoning" which ena-
bled the majority to ignore this well-defined precedent.83
Reviewing New Jersey casino law, Judge Higginbotham surmised that
Prinz probably did not commit the crime of defiant trespass, to which he
had pleaded guilty.84 In the dissent's view, this made the majority's invoca-
81. 705 F.2d at 699 (Higginbotham, J., dissenting). Judge Higginbotham stated
that the entire record of the prior case must be examined by the court before collat-
eral estoppel may be applied, unless the face of the complaint to which the plaintiff
pleaded guilty establishes that the subsequent action is barred. Id. at 699-700 (Hig-
ginbotham, J., dissenting) (citing Ashe v. Swenson, 397 U.S. 436, 444 (1970)) (further
citations omitted). Because Greate Bay had not introduced even the criminal com-
plaint, Judge Higginbotham asserted that neither the district court nor the Third
Circuit could have conducted the requisite inquiry. Id at 700 (Higginbotham, J.,
dissenting).
82. Id (citing Chisholm v. Defense Logistics Agency, 656 F.2d 42, 50 (3d Cir.
1981); Basista v. Weir, 340 F.2d 74, 81-82 (3d Cir. 1965)). In Basista, Judge Higgin-
botham noted, the Third Circuit refused to hold that a criminal conviction precluded
consideration of the lawfulness of the arrest in a subsequent civil action, even though
the indictment and judgment were introduced in evidence. Id. at 700 (Higginbot-
ham, J., dissenting). Judge Higginbotham explained this refusal on the basis of the
court's inability to determine, without a full transcript, whether the lawfulness of the
arrest had been determined in the earlier case. Id. For a discussion of Bafis/a, see
note 53 supra. Noting that the majority did not discuss Basis/a, Judge Higginbotham
declared, "The panel apparently failed to recognize, or chose to ignore it, as binding
precedent even though it is squarely on point and its approach has been reaffirmed
often." 705 F.2d at 700 (Higginbotham, J., dissenting). The dissent also cited the
Third Circuit's affirmation of this "necessarily decided" requirement in Chisholm and
Kauffinan. Id. at 699 (Higginbotham, J., dissenting) (citing Chisholm, 656 F.2d at 42,
49; KaujFnan, 420 F.2d at 1270, 1274). For a discussion of Chisholm and Kauffiman, see
note 53 supra.
83. 705 F.2d at 700 (Higginbotham, J., dissenting). Judge Higginbotham stated
that the majority had not properly considered the criminal conviction and had
merely assumed that because plaintiff had pleaded guilty to the charge of
defiant trespass his arrest was lawful and therefore he was collaterally es-
topped from maintaining an action, false imprisonment, for unlawful de-
tention where the lawfulness of the underlying arrest is a defense.
Id (citations omitted). The burden of proof to invoke collateral estoppel, explained
Judge Higginbotham, must center on the question of whether the casino had prob-
able cause to detain Prinz-not whether Prinz was trespassing. Id. Without a record
of the defiant trespass proceeding, Judge Higginbotham felt it was impossible to de-
termine whether the issue of probable cause was "necessarily decided" by Prinz's
guilty plea. Id
84. 705 F.2d at 701-02 (Higginbotham, J., dissenting). Because the casino had
no right to exclude a card counter, Judge Higginbotham reasoned that Prinz was
allowed to be present in the casino, and that therefore he could not have been guilty
under the defiant trespasser statute. Id (citing Uston v. Resorts Int'l Hotel, Inc., 89
N.J. 163, 445 A.2d 370 (1982)). For a discussion of Us/on and the common law right
to exclude amusement place patrons, see notes 54-58 and accompanying text supra.
For a discussion of and excerpt from the New Jersey defiant trespass statute, see note
5 and accompanying text supra.
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tion of collateral estoppel without an examination of the prior record a par-
ticularly egregious error.85
It is submitted that while the Pr'nz decision may be consistent with the
federal court's lenient approach to deficient pleadings, it misapplies rule
15(b) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure by replacing the concept of
implied consent with the court's own conclusion that an issue should have
been litigated.8 6 Greate Bay's references to Prinz's prior guilty plea were
made without a single mention of "collateral estoppel."'8 7 Greate Bay did
not plead collateral estoppel.88 Given that courts, including the Third Cir-
cuit, treat prior guilty pleas as admissible evidence without preclusive effect,
there was no obvious reason for Prinz or the trial court to have been on
notice that the affirmative defense of collateral estoppel was being asserted
against the false imprisonment claim.
8 9
The Prnz court cited the single case of Federal Savings & Loan Insurance
Corp. v. Hogan in support of its decision to apply rule 15(b)'s implied consent
to litigate exception. 90 It should be noted, however, that while the defense of
collateral estoppel had not been pleaded in Hogan, it was subsequently ar-
ticulated in the course of that trial as well as in post-trial motions.9 ' More-
over, the Hogan court noted two mitigating circumstances, not present in
Prinz, which justified employing the implied consent exception: 1) the party
85. 705 F.2d at 702 (Higginbotham, J., dissenting). Judge Higginbotham
concluded,
Prinz suffered the indignity of being in police custody for 20 hours for an
act which was not a crime. The majority compounds the injustice . . .by
allowing the casino to rely on a collateral estoppel defense which was
neither pleaded nor proven as required by the rules and precedents.
Id.
86. For a discussion of the liberal principles underlying the Federal Rules, see
note 15 and accompanying text supra. For a discussion of rule 15(b) and implied
consent to litigate, see notes 17-23 and accompanying text supra.
87. See note 11 and accompanying text supra.
88. See note 9 and accompanying text supra.
89. See notes 46-47 supra. It should be noted that where a guilty plea is treated
as an admission against interest in the evidenttary sense, this admission is generally
understood to bear two consequences: 1) for the purposes of all proceedings relating
to the original criminal action, including appeals, the admission is deemed a "judi-
cial" admission, and therefore conclusive; and 2) in subsequent unrelated proceed-
ings-civil and criminal-the admission is deemed an "evidentiary admission"
which is not conclusive and may be explained. See State Farm Mutual Auto. Ins. Co.
v. Worthington, 405 F.2d 683, 686 (7th Cir. 1968) (citing IV WIGMORE, EvinENCE
§ 1066.) See also United States v. American Packing Corp., 113 F. Supp. 223, 226
(D.NJ. 1953) (a plea of guilty is only an evidentiary admission in proceedings not
related to the original action in which the plea was made).
90. Prinz, 705 F.2d at 694 (citing Federal Sav. & Loan Ins. Co. v. Hogan, 476
F.2d 1182, 1186 (7th Cir. 1973)). For discussion of the pertinent holding of Hogan, see
note 22 supra. Hogan involved a suit by a savings and loan association (Association) to
recover damages for an alleged conspiracy to defraud by means of bribery. 476 F.2d
at 1184. Hogan, a defendant in this action, had previously been found not liable in a
suit by the Association for reformation of a mortgage on the grounds of fraud. Id
Hogan had not pleaded collateral estoppel in this second action. Id at 1185.
91. Id. at 1186 n.2.
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who had failed to properly plead had appeared at trial pro se, and was "obvi-
ously at a disadvantage; ' '92 and 2) the party against whom collateral estoppel
would apply was the party that initially raised the underlying facts of the
defense, thus manifesting its "express consent" to litigate the matter.93
The Prinz majority also cited Sartin v. Commissioner of Pub/ic Safety for the
"general rule" that "an affirmative defense not pleaded in the district court
is not available on appeal."'94 It is suggested that Sarthn, where allusions to
the prior guilty plea were accompanied by neither articulation of the affirm-
ative defense nor by sufficient evidence to establish that defense,95 provides
the more apposite precedent for the facts of Prnz.9 6 In Sartin, the Eighth
Circuit held that the unpleaded defense of collateral estoppel had been
waived.
97
Complementing the notice and consent requirements of the procedural
rules, common law safeguards buttress the doctrine of collateral estoppel to
prevent its unfair or inappropriate application. 98 Preeminent among these is
the requirement that collateral estoppel be raised at the trial level and sup-
ported by the introduction of a complete record of the prior proceedings. 99
The Third Circuit has been adamant in its demand for a complete record for
the purposes of demonstrating identity of issues,100 and furnishing the basis
for determining the fairness of invoking collateral estoppel in the particular
case.10 1 It is suggested, therefore, that in ignoring its own precedent, the
Third Circuit has introduced a new level of imprecision and potential un-
fairness to the doctrine of collateral estoppel. In essence, the Prinz decision
allows a court to take the parties at their word as to precisely what was
92. Id
93. Id. at 1187. The Hogan court based its holding solely on express consent to
litigate, and not implied consent. Id For a discussion of rule 15(b) and implied
consent to litigate, see notes 18-22 and accompanying text supra.
94. Prinz, 705 F.2d at 694 (citing Sartin, 535 F.2d at 433). For a discussion of the
facts and holding of Sartin, see note 16 supra. For a discussion of waiver of an affirma-
tive defense, see note 16 and accompanying text supra.
95. See note 16 supra.
96. For the pertinent facts of Prinz, see notes 9-11 and accompanying text supra.
97. 535 F.2d at 433. The Eighth Circuit stated, "Officer Mickelson did not
plead res judicata or collateral estoppel in the District Court. Accordingly, those
affirmative defenses were not available to him in that court and are not available
here." Id
98. See note 99 infra. For a general discussion regarding judicial concerns with
the fairness of employing collateral estoppel, see notes 29 & 37 and accompanying
text supra.
99. See notes 31-35 and accompanying text supra.
100. See, e.g., Chisholm v. Defense Logistics Agency, 656 F.2d 42 (3d Cir. 1981);
Kauffman v. Moss, 420 F.2d 1270 (3d Cir. 1970); Basista v. Weir, 340 F.2d 74 (3d
Cir. 1965). For a discussion of the facts and holdings of Chisholm, Kauffman, and
Basisa, see note 53 supra.
101. See Scooper Dooper, Inc. v. Kraftco Corp., 494 F.2d 840, 845 (3d Cir. 1974)
(collateral estoppel is an available defense only if it is shown that the party against
whom the plea is asserted has had a full and fair opportunity to litigate in the prior
proceeding).
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determined in the prior adjudication.10 2
Moreover, it is submitted, the Prinz court seems to have been unaware
of the relative dearth of precedent for applying collateral estoppel where
1) there is no mutuality of parties;' 0 3 2) the case involves a prior guilty plea
to a minor offense; 10 4 and 3) the issue precluded is not an element of the
crime to which the guilty plea was entered. 0 5
Although a small minority of courts have dispensed with the mutuality
rule in guilty plea collateral estoppel cases,106 they have done so only upon a
showing that the guilty pleader had had ample incentive to litigate the mat-
ter. 10 7 In contrast, it is submitted, the Third Circuit ignored this incentive
factor when it gave preclusive effect to Prinz's guilty plea to a misdemeanor
which was punishable by a twenty-five dollar fine.10 8 Furthermore, it is sub-
mitted that the fairness of affording collateral estoppel effect to a trespass
conviction where the issue precluded is false imprisonment is dubious. 10 9
Some courts have stated that even a guilty pleader has the right to litigate
102. The majority in Prrnz cited Kauffnan v. Moss and United States v. Schneider for
its statement that Create Bay's allegations of fact regarding Prinz's guilty plea were
sufficient to bar Prinz's false imprisonment claim "by virtue of collateral estoppel."
705 F.2d at 693. For a discussion of the appropriateness of treating Schneider as prece-
dent, see note 105 infra. For a discussion of the facts and holding of Kauffman, see note
53 supra. It is submitted that the Third Circuit's citation to Kauffinan is a non se-
quitur, since that decision stands for the proposition that without a thorough exami-
nation of the record of the prior criminal proceeding, collateral estoppel must not be
invoked. Kauffman, 420 F.2d at 1270. The Kauffman court did not question thefact of
Kauffman's prior conviction, it merely refused to infer from the conviction any issues
(even one so "necessary to the judgment" as the veracity of the witnesses) without an
examination of the record. Id
103. See notes 40-43 & 47 and accompanying text supra. It is possible that there
is an argument for Create Bay's being in privity with the state regarding the trespass
conviction, since Create Bay did file the complaint against Prinz. However, this ar-
gument was neither made to, nor considered by, the court since the entire issue of
mutuality of parties went undiscussed in the Prinz opinion.
104. See notes 48-49 and accompanying text supra.
105. See note 44 supra. One case cited by the Third Circuit for the preclusive
effect of a prior guilty plea is United States v. Schneider, a district court case. 705 F.2d at
693 (citing 139 F. Supp. 826 (S.D.N.Y. 1956)). For the facts and holding of Schneider,
see notes 44 & 46 supra. In Schneider, however, mutuality of parties was present, the
prior plea was to a felony, collateral estoppel had been pleaded, and the issue pre-
cluded was found to have been an element of the crime pleaded guilty to. 139 F.
Supp. at 928-30. In fact, the Schneider court carefully scrutinized the record of the
prior proceeding to assure itself of this issue identity. Id at 830.
106. See note 47 and accompanying text supra.
107. See notes 48-49 and accompanying text supra.
108. For a discussion of the facts and circumstances surrounding Prinz's guilty
plea, see notes 5-7 and accompanying text supra.
109. See 705 F.2d 700 n.5 (Higginbotham, J., dissenting). Judge Higginbotham
stated,
The majority apparently relies on Jorgensen v. Pennsylvania Railroad Co., in
support of the proposition that in New Jersey a guilty plea to the charge of
defiant trespass estops plaintiff from proving a false imprisonment claim.
Neither Jorgensen, nor any other New Jersey case stands for this proposition.
Indeed,Jorgensen states only that "[tihe truth or falsity of the charge [of false
1983-84]
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the lawfulness of his arrest since it is not an element of the crime to which he
pleaded guilty."10 The Prinz court did not address this issue."'I
Finally, it is suggested that the Third Circuit's decision is particularly
surprising since it is not altogether clear that Prinz had committed a crime,
notwithstanding his guilty plea.1 2 The New Jersey Supreme Court in Uson
has severely limited the right of casinos to expel individuals for being card
counters." 13 The tautological reasoning by which a casino may claim the
statutory right to expel card counters by simply labeling them trespassers per
se is highly questionable in light of New Jersey precedent.' 
1 4
Thus, it is asserted, what at first glance appears to have been a simple
accommodation of rules 8(c) and 15(b) may have considerably wider impli-
cations: the Third Circuit's holding serves not only to relieve a party of the
burden of proof in litigating the defense of collateral estoppel,'" 5 but also
imposes an unfair burden on litigants and trial judges who, in the dissent's
characterization, will have to be omniscient to discern when collateral estop-
pel is being asserted or tried.' 16 More significantly, the Third Circuit has
attached harsh consequences to an individual's decision to plead guilty to a
minor offense."17 It is conceivable that the court's ruling will encourage a
greater volume of litigation in the criminal courts since defendants will be
wary of the consequences of simply "paying the fine."" '  It is even more
apparent that the Prinz majority's approach, if followed, will actually defeat
imprisonment] is, of course, germane to the establishment of probable
cause."
Id. (quoting 38 N.J. Super. at 349, 118 A.2d at 782).
110. See, e.g., Prosise v. Haring, 667 F.2d 1133 (4th Cir. 1981), af'd, 103 S. Ct.
2368 (1983). For a discussion of the Prosise facts and holding, see note 44 supra.
111. See note 109 supra.
112. See 705 F.2d at 702 (Higginbotham, J., dissenting) (stating unequivocally
that Prinz "pleaded guilty for an act which as a matter of law was not a crime under
New Jersey law").
113. See notes 55-58 and accompanying text supra.
114. See 705 F.2d at 702 (Higginbotham, J., dissenting). The dissent argued,
[T]here are risks which are assumed in swearing out a complaint against a
person who, as it turns out, did not commit a crime. That person. . . may
decide to bring a civil action in an attempt to remedy the harm to him as a
result of having been detained and arrested. Here the casino gambled by
relying on an erroneous theory of criminal law as to what constitutes the
offense of defiant trespass in order to detain and charge Prinz. . . . In my
view, the casino should not win on appeal with the present record before us.
Id
115. See notes 99-101 and accompanying text supra.
116. 705 F.2d at 699 (Higginbotham, J., dissenting). Judge Higginbotham ad-
ded that "trial judges should not be expected to see the issue(s) which counsel do not
plead, articulate or litigate." Id
117. See notes 118-119 and accompanying text infra.
118. See Note, Preclusive Efect Extended to Guilty Pleas, supra note 45, at 1354-56
(noting such possible impacts as a decline in plea bargaining, fewer guilty pleas,
greater volume of litigation and onerous demands on the courts' already limited
resources).
[Vol. 29: p. 857
36
Villanova Law Review, Vol. 29, Iss. 3 [1984], Art. 11
https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/vlr/vol29/iss3/11
1983-84] THIRD CIRCUIT REVIEW 893
the federal courts' explicit policy of assuring every party a full and fair op-
portunity to litigate his claim. 1 19
Susan M. Harrison
119. For a discussion of the policy that a party have a full and fair opportunity
to litigate, see note 37 and accompanying text supra.
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